Part 4: Proposition 9 to Conclusion

Proposition 9. The world without the Mantic offers the best test of the Sophic. It is marked by (A) piteous disappointment, (B) a puzzling deadness of spirit, and (C) a world plagued by doubt, insecurity, cynicism, and despair.

A. The Sophic program always ends in failure, leading to disappointment and disillusionment among its advocates.

Modern Statements: It now appears that "the nineteenth century, which believed itself boldly progressive, was spiritually a period of obscurantism and reaction."1 The vast promises of the nineteenth century have not been realized.2 The scientists, especially astronomers, have turned out to be very poor scientific prophets; and as a rule the better the scientist, the weaker his prophetic powers—they lack the Mantic touch.3 Ecological crises "reveal serious inadequacies" which hitherto escaped notice in many areas.4 There has been a comical disproportion between the promises and pretensions of anthropology and its accomplishments.5 "It is obvious . . . that the Wellsian dream [of a mechanized utopia] has turned into a nightmare."6 With all the talk and promise of the exciting quest for knowledge, "only one new chemical reaction [has been] discovered by an American chemical company during the last fifteen years."7 "Practically all who are now Ph.D.s want to be told what to do. . . . They seem to be scared to death to think up problems of their own," while the "idea for a jet engine . . . was met with a massive indifference from the scientific bureaucracy."8 "In social science, particularly, methodology is being made the route to prestige."9 "Fashions in topics of study and methods of research have come one after another. . . . As a result we have botanists who know no plants and zoologists who know no animals."10 "Our wealth of scientific gadgets and our vast organization of scientific projects are in heavy disproportion to our depth of scientific thought. We 'research the hell' out of everything: we contemplate very little."11 In philology and scholarship a deterioration of knowledge has taken place in the last thirty years, especially in America. Today the tendency in linguistics is in the "direction of overall anarchy" in which most classifications of unwritten languages contain "elements of unreliability."12 In philosophy, "how many doctor's theses . . . are ever actually read by any one except the examiners?"13 Instead of an insatiable, predicted demand for scientists and engineers, most of them soon become obsolescent.14

Ancient Statements: With the rise of rationalist (Sophic) Greek civilization, "one might seem to have got a principle of continuous progress. . . . In our modern civilization, which reincarnates the Hellenic principle, we ordinarily believe that such continuous modification and improvement is going on. But in the ancient Hellenic civilization the promise and potency of its principle in every line of activity . . . seemed to meet with an arrest as suddenly as it had begun."15 Bevan is mystified by this: Why did Hellenism, in the very moment of completing its conquest, become paralyzed? Why does the study of Greek literature always stop at the threshold of the Hellenistic period? Because only the Mantic writers are interesting! The new education of the Greeks thought of itself as throbbing with life and vitality; to keep up the illusion it had to go on progressively adding lurid to sensational materials until in the end "the powerful spicing had become the main dish" and all was ruined.16 Education did nothing to check intellectual and moral decline and, if anything, accelerated it.17 Intellectually everything ground to a halt, just as the school reached the peak of its splendor.18 There was a paralyzing finality about the arguments of the Sophists, who "looked for no revelation." Under Sophist tutelage, "the Athenians were already losing their sense of political reality, . . . growing impatient of sincerity and plain truth."19 Isocrates' conviction that education would be the solution to everything turned out to be a great disappointment. Contrary to expectation, "There was no steady advance of natural and mental science to serve as breeding ground" for future scientists among the followers of Aristotle, whose teaching was converted into a "purely conceptual scholasticism."20 Though the Sophists gave us "a 2000-year unbroken tradition" of rational learning beginning with Gorgias, the Schoolmen expended those centuries in the usual perennial arguments over the relative merits of the New versus the Old Education.21 "And the intellectual scribblers of the decadent period" strongly influenced the thinking of the Late Renaissance.22

B. The result is nihilism, societal breakdown, and a puzzling deadness of spirit.

Modern Statements: The "clearest and the most comprehensive expression" of the world view of Darwinism was given by Tyndale, noting that in the " 'purely natural and inevitable march of evolution from atoms . . . to the proceedings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science' . . . life is of profound unimportance," being a "mere eddy in the primeval slime."23 "We must in all circumstances learn to accept the fact that . . . in the longest run, the sum of all human endeavour has no recognizable significance."24 "A scientific explanation of the course of evolution therefore avoids reference to either purpose or progress in its recognition of the factors of change."25 "Life on earth is nothing but some elements expressing generally available energy in a specific rhythm. Man is nothing but a living creature expressing general tendencies in special reflections."26 "That all the labours of the ages . . . are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, . . . beneath the debris of a universe in ruin, . . . [is] so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand."27 Hence the obsession with entropy, "the rigid determinism desiccating the world actually follows from the equations of mechanics and is the essence of its laws."28 "At the end [we find the mute and terrifying world of Pascal's 'libertin,' the senseless world of modern scientific philosophy. In the end] we find nihilism and despair."29 "Such happiness as life is capable of comes from the full participation of all our powers in the endeavor to wrest from each changing situation of experience its own full and unique meaning."30

Determined attempts are made, especially in England, to obliterate all distinction between the human mind and the automatic computer. The idea is "that man, if he is indeed nothing but an improved beast, can by one more easy step be nothing more than a mere machine—an object which science can wholly analyze, wholly capture within its special framework."31 The robot works on exactly the same behavioristic principles as James Watson's or John Dewey's human being; there is no essential difference between them.32 Already people are being programmed to act as machines, "to behave like computers . . . I [Gordon Taylor] am shocked that [the University of Michigan] tolerated this,"33 while the fundamental and eternal battle between good and evil in humanity is disbelieved. "That we can design ethical robots . . . is enough to prove that man's moral nature needs no supernatural source."34 "There is no morality in life, no truth, no goodness, and no beauty. Life in all its adaptability and elasticity is as elemental as iron or sulfur or oxygen or carbon. This is the correct perspective of life. It would indeed save much trouble and avoid many unnecessary errors if philosophers and scientists could look at life in the correct perspective."35 "I like a philosophy which exalts mankind. To degrade it is to encourage men to vice," writes Diderot, yet in the next line goes on: "When I have compared men to the immense space which is over their heads and under their feet, I have made them ants that bustle about on an anthill. . . . Their vices and their virtues, shrinking in the same proportion, are reduced to nothingness."36 Science "is teaching them for the first time to use their minds, not to seek reassurance in the face of life's suffering and separation, and not to look for some escape from transitoriness that is one of the unavoidable features of existence, but to strengthen and multiply the connective links that establish human life more firmly in its natural habitat by eliminating error and illusion and distortion and rendering more and more transparent our relations with one another and with the rest of nature."37 Thus it takes the easy way and pushes downhill, making a virtue of the negative: as if men did not already recognize their miserable state! Science gives us a world without values: aesthetic, ethical, religious, "But a world which is without value, Whitehead points out, is also a world without meaning. . . . The world just is; it cannot be explained."38 This was the great appeal of science to the Marxists: "The goal was a completely materialistic theory of life."39 Marx thought his system was "somehow deducible from Darwin's discoveries. He proposed to acknowledge his indebtedness by dedicating Das Kapital to Darwin."40 On the other hand, A. Wheelis's End of the Modern Age shows how laissez-faire capitalism was the direct offspring and corollary of the same naturalistic determinism, with the same amoral materialism. So we read conscientious scholarly Russian studies on "From the Other Side to This Side: A Guide to Atheism," "Concreteness in Studying the Overcoming of Religious Survivals," "Atheistic Education and the Overcoming of Religious Survivals," and "The Principles of Scientific Atheism in Technical Colleges."

Ancient Statements: How closely the ancient Sophic attitude matches the modern is revealed in a statement of Professor Enslin of Harvard: Clement of Alexandria scorns the " 'simple' Christians" who were "afraid of Greek philosophy as children fear ghosts."41 Though Clement's own writings are full of "rubbish . . . triple-A nonsense; . . . frequent highly fanciful, at times grotesque, derivations of words and terms," even "pathetic nonsense," they at least show him to be "a man who prized insight, who preferred the voice of reasoned conviction to the braying of Balaam's ass."42 In the same spirit, Origen, also a product of the University of Alexandria, wrote, when he read the Torah, "I blush to think that God could have given these laws; the laws of men, of the Romans, Athenians, Spartans, for example, are far nobler and more reasonable."43 "Modern humanity for the most part shares the view of Pliny" that "the belief in rebirth or life after death is nothing but a pacifier for children and belongs to a mortality greedy for everlasting life."44 The strength of the Sophic is its appeal to the obvious, its contemptuous dismissal of belief in anything we cannot see, which enabled it to turn the Mantic out of doors with ease, merrily debunking anything that required an effort of faith or imagination.45

The credo of the educated was and remained Horace's Nil admirari "don't take anything seriously"46—Horace describes himself good naturedly as a cheerful pig from the sty of Epicurus; but as for believing in anything—credat Judaeus Appeles—let the Jews believe that sort of stuff! The same depressing and hopeless attitude dominates in the Wisdom Literature of the Egyptians47 and of the Babylonians.48

C. It is the moral condition of life in a world without Mantic that most strongly proclaims the bankruptcy of the Sophic.

Modern Statements: "The beginning of modern science is also the beginning of a calamity."49 Why? For one thing, robbing life of meaning makes a hash of morality. The fundamental principle of modern physics is that "the transition of the world into the equilibrium state [entropy], and hence its death, is inevitable and irreversible. . . . Thus, the world is to become a sheer desert-like monotony. . . . Despite its significance and progress, theoretical mechanics seems a dry or even dull science. Perhaps this is an emotional indicator of the incompleteness of the principles of the exact sciences. The trouble here," continues Nikolai Kozyrev, is "the deep discrepancy between the world of the exact sciences and the real world," while all are taught to believe that the world of science is the real world and the only world.50 "Thus it comes about, fantastic though it may sound, that men lie with their neighbour's wives denuded of the last shred of a guilty conscience because observations of the changes of Mercury's perihelion enabled Einstein to alter our ideas about space-time!"51 The "problem of evil, . . . science for five hundred years has deliberately excluded from its purview."52 "The force that devastated Hiroshima is really insignificant by comparison with the force that devastated the district of Watts,"53 but both may be traced to the same immoral source. "There is no longer a philosophy of nature; . . . the whole field of the knowledge of sensible nature is given over to the sciences of phenomena, to empiriological science. . . . By the same token there is no longer any speculative metaphysics."54 Science is "now without superior direction or light, is abandoned to empirical and quantitative law, and is entirely separated from the whole order of wisdom."55

Everyone wants promotion and prestige on the ship, "But where is the boat going? No one seems to have the faintest idea; nor, for that matter, do they see much point in even raising the question. . . . Most see themselves as objects more acted upon than acting—and their future, therefore, determined as much by the system as by themselves."56 This is plainly seen in the dependence of our whole well-being on the imponderables of the Dow Jones averages. The Sophic promised that it could handle everything: "Modern science and modern conditions of life have taught us to meet occasions of apprehension by a critical analysis of their causes and conditions" rather than by appealing to heaven.57 It has always been promised that mankind could be freed from all its shackles by technology.58 But now it turns out that the Sophic does not even offer escape from dullness. "Truth is not the only aim of science. We want more than mere truth: what we look for is interesting truth."59 This is diametrically opposed to most university departments that teach that they are only doing their job when they are dull and, like the Berlin School of Egyptology, glory in their strict avoidance of anything that might be interesting; they have found something heroic in mere patient plodding and had a horror of "Fantasie" and "Romantik." The highest reward for them was professional status, as it is for the heroes of C. P. Snow's novels, all eminent Cambridge scientists who have only one object in life—to achieve ever more "eminence." They will engage in all manner of fraud and deception to achieve it; their work interests them only as long as they can show off to the world and to each other. "Darwinism has come, and has conquered, and as a vital influence in the spiritual life, has gone."60 Science could not even hold up its own end. "Because of the sterility of its concepts, historical geology . . . has become static and unproductive.61 Since then plate tectonics have livened things up a bit, but still "most of us refuse to discard or reformulate, and the result is the present deplorable state of our discipline."62 What kept them going? Showmanship, self-dramatization: without the stage of the university to show off on, where would most of us be?

And so we have the present state of the world described by Chicago University physicist John R. Platt: "too dangerous for anything but Utopia."63 Science has made it dangerous, but provides no Utopia. Jerome Wiesner of M.I.T. claimed: "The armaments race is an accelerating downward-spiral to Oblivion."64 So will accumulation of scientific knowledge save us? It is now so specialized that "even engineers would not know how to reconstruct the machinery of our civilization if it somehow collapsed or was destroyed."65 "The [amount of] knowledge in the world [in 1960] is doubling every ten years. . . . Soon . . . our entire culture will have collapsed owing to its incomprehensive complexity."66 We have reached a saturation point, though "probably 99 per cent of human ability has been wholly wasted; even today, those of us who consider ourselves cultured . . . glimpse the profounder resources of our minds only once or twice in a lifetime.67 There are "many unpleasant ways in which the world can go wrong [and very few in which it] can go right."68 The human animal may have fatally overreached itself unless it takes on some sense in the eleventh hour. Meanwhile, we resign ourselves to Existentialism, "the philosophical refuge of the despairing spirit caught in the turmoil of moral crisis. It has always been—and is today, essentially and at its core, a bitter-sweet philosophy of despair."69 This is 100 years after William James challenged the world to do the honest thing and base its philosophy only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair.

Ancient Statements: The ancients went through the same experience and collapsed. With the complete victory of the Sophic mind a namenloses Elend (indefinable malaise) covered the whole glorious Hellenistic world. Christianity has been blamed for this, but Christian influence became dominant only after the churchmen themselves had gone all out to accommodate to the prevailing Sophic teaching of the time—that of Alexandria: then it was that all joy seemed to go out of the world.70 Long before Christian influence was felt, the world of the Roman Satirists was full blown: an utterly cynical, immoral, and pessimistic world. The rational (Sophic) mood of Hellenism had emancipated men from moral restraints, when, as today, they "speak and write as if the relation of the sexes were something that could be put on a plain, scientific, common sense basis,"71 but at the same time, as Bevan shrewdly observes, they became everywhere obsessed with a passion for bathing, a constant obsession with fighting dirt and a fanatical desire to flee from it and sweeten themselves—subconscious betrayal of guilt.72

Intellectually, the accumulation of knowledge reached a saturation point when the cultural and intellectual "deposit of the past had become too great for any mind to absorb" and people simply gave up trying, as they have today.73 The easy way was to specialize and thus lose sight of the larger questions of life; the best thinking of the professors for centuries on end became thereafter incurably trivial.74 Calls to a revival of Hellenism got nowhere.75 The great antique civilization subsided into a restless, superficial world of theatromania, mob violence, crime and corruption.76 The only security was found in the university, where the doctors held undeviatingly to the age-old routines of hollow lectures, fierce feuds, and adroit politics, oblivious to the world collapsing around them. Quintillian advises the young to "stay away from the big schools!" with their cynicism and immorality, but then admits that they do offer the best chances for a career in any field. By the fifth century nobody knew what to believe, since the schoolmen had made a virtue of questioning everything without really looking for an answer—busywork and self-deception had become the way of life.77 In the end it was the teaching of the "physicist" that men should look for the explanation to all things in natural causes alone that laid the foundation for the ruin of everything, according to Plato.78

Proposition 10. Our notes add up to something quite unexpected. I had expected to do the inevitable and call for a proper balance between the Sophic and the Mantic, each of which has its faults as well as its virtues. But that is not the way it turns out at all! Not for me, at least. Nothing could be plainer than the lesson that the human race in the times under survey has disastrously neglected the Mantic. The Christian Church went all out to identify itself with the Sophic, as it still does.

Modern Statements: The founders of Roman Catholic theology "had a boundless esteem for the work of the Schools."79 To begin with, the Church claims to found its case on reason. The Catholic believes that he can produce reasoned and convincing, even coercive arguments. Even the doctrine of the Trinity can be proved indirectly by reason, since "it is not . . . irrational to accept these truths on the authority of the Church, provided that you can prove by reason that the Church is infallible"80 and "the credentials of the Roman Catholic Church can be proved by pure reason and by pure reason alone."81 "Medieval philosophy was not so much a servant of theology as theology was a servant of philosophy. . . . That was the case of Saint Thomas Aquinas, who strictly subordinated theology to Aristotelian philosophy."82 Under the Scholastic philosophers, "philosophy called 'Logic' dominated the schools . . . logica sola placet, science was everything."83 The logica nova84 of the twelfth century was a heritage of the Ancient Sophist schools, "a triumph of sophistry."85 The mystical trends of the seventeenth century were vigorously condemned by the Church, since revelation "is universally denied by the scholastics."86 Even the early Jesuits were given a bad time for toying with the idea of revelation.

Modern Protestantism objected to Mormonism primarily on grounds of scientific enlightenment—"seeing visions in an age of railways" was Dickens's withering comment.87 Protestantism broke with Scholasticism, but its rejection of revelation led it straight into the arms of nineteenth-century natural science and Hegel's philosophy of history, "formulated by materialism and Darwinism into the dogma that all historical phenomena may be explained through mundane causes only and that their development was or must have been from a low to a high level."88 Biblical criticism insisted on following the rigorous, unflinchingly skeptical procedures of science.89 In a spirit of emancipation "they talk of a religion without theology; but when pressed as to what that means, they offer a diffuse romantic sentimentalism, with rhapsodies over a pursuit of goodness . . . and at last to a sort of perpetual motion ever 'upward and onward' but with no indication of any specific direction."90 Alfred North Whitehead sums up the process of accommodation: Each new scientific advance has "found the religious thinkers unprepared," until "finally, after struggle" their teachings were "modified and otherwise interpreted," so that "the next generation of religious apologists then congratulates the religious world on the deeper insight which has been gained," and so it goes with "continued repetition of this undignified retreat, during many generations."91 And so from the beginning, by a progressive accommodation, the churches have always remained respectably Sophic.

Today the churches are suggesting that they may have erred in this, and are calling for revelation to rescue them. "Liberalism was the voice of secular confidence in science, education and culture. It accommodated its claims to fit human expectations. . . . For this reason it failed to find wings. Theological accommodationism is a parasite dependent on its host. . . . Liberalism is dead, or dying, as secular confidence wains."92

Statements on the Ancient Church: "From the 5th century on the Church became an 'intellectual' entity" and ever since one sees in "the Church a thing of reason—un être de raison."93 Mosheim asked: Was the conversion of the Doctors a blessing or a curse for the Church? to which he replied: "I must confess myself unable to decide the point." In the third century this led to serious clashes between popular faith and the sophisticated theology of the Doctors.94 The Doctors won hands-down. The authority of Alexandria prevailed, "recasting the permanent elements of the church's doctrine in harmony with a religious philosophy of Grecian character. What the Apologists were compelled to do, these men willingly sought to accomplish."95 By the beginning of the second century, "with perfect impunity . . . they proceeded to do violence to the scripture, blithely disregarding the original teachings, . . . busily working out elaborate structures of syllogisms. . . . They deserted the Holy Scriptures for . . . Euclid, . . . Aristotle, and Theophrastus."96 Challenged by Celsus, a doughty champion of the Sophic, Origen yields to him on every point, explaining that Celsus does not realize that real Christians are all for science, too.97 In a like situation, Octavius points out to his educated friend that all real Christians are philosophers, just as he is; the vulgar simply don't understand.98 The Churchmen embraced Hellenism even though they knew it had overcome early Christianity.99 "In the philosophical interpretation of its eschatological hope, Christian theology from the very beginning clings to Aristotle," who "provided Christian philosophers with all the elements out of which an adequate conception of personality could be built up. . . . One cannot fail to acknowledge the Aristotelian origin of the main anthropological ideas in early Christian theology."100 It is possible to call St. Augustine, the founder of Catholic and Protestant theology, "the first modern man" because of his fides quaerens intellectum—the Mantic seeking to become Sophic.101

Proposition 11. An approach to the authentically Mantic is (A) desirable, and (B) possible.

A. The need for a "return" to the Mantic is felt today as it was anciently.

Modern Statements: " 'Modern man' . . . is the heir of . . . the sceptical tradition. . . . In the present epoch a large and increasing number of Europeans have expressed the desire to return [to] . . . the religious tradition. . . . Whenever they take it into their head to 'return,' the shades of all the great sceptics, Pierre Bayle and Voltaire, Ernest Renan and Sigmund Freud and the rest, rise up around them and persuade them, with considerable success, that they cannot go back. This is the religious dilemma of 'modern man.' "102 They cannot go back, because they were never there—their religion was always Sophic. "The trouble with the Bible has been its interpreters, who have scaled and whittled down that sense of infinitude into finite and limited concepts. . . . Here we are with our finite beings and physical senses in the presence of a universe whose possibilities are infinite, and even though we may not apprehend them, those infinite possibilities are actualities."103 "God grant that we are mistaken. But if we have read the signs of the times correctly, . . . the only salvation for mankind will be found in religion."104 "The ruling concept of our day, the degrading and life-impoverishing error of a Nature which is not deeply and inwardly bound to our own natures, must be overcome. The idea of a spiritual life without spirit, that can be examined like a problem in physics, must be overcome."105

Ancient Statements: Plato and Aristotle, after mastering the Sophic, both turned whole-heartedly to the Mantic quest. In the pagan world the cult of Serapis was a determined attempt to turn Mantic; in the Christian, the turning to Monasticism, pilgrimages, and the temple show a yearning for the Mantic,106 all strenuously opposed by the Doctors of the Church.

B. Is it possible?

"But today the Baconian approach is all but dead. . . . How does a new hypothesis come into existence? That is where intuition comes in." Peter Medawar claims that "Scientists are usually too proud or too shy"; where intuition is concerned, "they feel it to be incompatible with their conception of themselves as men of facts and rigorous inductive judgments."107 Some scientists have suggested, to avoid yielding any purely scientific ground, the idea of man initiating a line of robots which then independently culminate in the production of a perfect robot, which proceeds to create—a human race!108 thus bringing God into the picture without having to apologize! Today there is increasing realization in the churches that "the living God to Whom men address their prayers is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, not the philosophers' God, the idea of the Absolute."109 Countless articles today point out that we cannot attain the Mantic without revelation. For a definitive statement, see the first section of the Doctrine and Covenants.

We are not advocating pagan religion in preference to modern science, since both stand on the same foundation through centuries of accommodation. Yet some Christian leaders view Greek Mantic with respect and even call for a return to it through Christian channels!110 The true seeker seeks everywhere—he is a true scientist—but to search he must be a believer; for even in the lab, "Ye receive no witness until after the trial of your faith" (Ether 12:6). To illustrate this, "Bacon . . . was an enemy of the Copernican hypothesis. Don't theorize, he said, but open your eyes and observe without prejudice (faith), and you cannot doubt that the Sun moves and that the Earth is at rest. By contrast, Galileo [wrote:] . . . 'I cannot . . . express strongly enough my unbounded admiration for the greatness of mind of these men who conceived (the heliocentric system) and held it to be true . . . , in violent opposition to the evidence of their own senses.' "111 It is perfectly proper to believe and seek, to have faith and hope, and to labor to be worthy of receiving revelation.

The Mantic is quite as intellectual as the Sophic: it takes more pure mental calculation to operate a Urim and Thummim than it does to use an Egyptian dictionary, and the brainwork required of the Saints is formidable (cf. D&C 93:53). In a General Epistle of the First Presidency in 1851 they were told, "It becomes us, as Saints of the Most High, to inform and become informed; and to treasure up knowledge and wisdom concerning all things."112 Knowledge does not have to be Sophic to be real and exact; in the Melchizedek Priesthood Manual for 1972/73, President Joseph Fielding Smith equated real knowledge with the gift of the Holy Ghost: "There is nothing more important in the lives of members of the Church than to have the gift of the Holy Ghost. There is nothing of greater importance to the individual member of the Church than the gift of knowledge, and this does not come by observation but by constant study and faith."113 "There should be no 'laymen' in the Church. . . . If there are any such, then they have neglected their responsibilities. . . . Each member of the Church should be so well versed that he, or she, would be able to discern whether or not any doctrine taught conforms to the revealed word of the Lord. Moreover, the members of the Church are entitled [through obedience to the commandments] . . . to have the spirit of discernment."114

Proposition 12. It is Science that now challenges the Sophic position. "Science" has at least discredited the Sophic position. Since the days of the ancient Atomists, the Sophic view of life has rested on two propositions: (A) that all existence is composed ultimately of discrete irreducible particles, beyond which and beside which there is no reality; (B) that all things are the result of the random accidental interactions of these particles. Both these propositions are today being declared bankrupt, not by the philosophers and theologians, but by the physical and biological scientists.

Modern Statements: The Atomist proposition explained by Descartes: "From complex whole move to less complex part. Reduce! . . . from multiplicity to uniformity."115 Hume: "You will find it [the whole] to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines."116 "Humanities strove to become sciences, each science to become physics, . . . the ultimate destination in every field being always that final elementary particle."117 But instead of the ultimate particle "our holy mission to get it all straight has yielded an ever-proliferating brood of erratically behaving elementary particles. . . . 'The conception of objective reality,' writes Heisenberg, 'has thus evaporated . . . into the transparent clarity of a mathematics that represents no longer the behavior of particles but rather our knowledge of this behavior.'"118 "The structure of a physical system such as a proton is now seen to be no absolute thing . . . but a relative concept which depends on the energy involved and the particular properties which are being studied. . . . There is no substance in the argument that physics must ultimately have a full stop in constituent parts too simple to be analysed further."119 "[Banging] the hadrons together . . . has completely upset the atomist notion that there is a limit to divisibility. . . . As the energy is increased there is no logical limit to . . . what may be found as we look deeper into space."120 "There is really only one law, which is that the total energy is conserved."121 "Energy . . . is the fundamental physical quantity of which mass and radiation—matter and light—are two manifestations."122

The clearest expression of the theory of random chance evolution is Robert Jastrow's popular book Red Giants and White Dwarfs123 (which has been required reading in some courses at BYU): "Yet the fact is that a single thread of evidence runs from the atom and the nucleus through the formation of stars and planets to the complexities of the living organism."124 "Darwin saw that the forms of life existing on the earth today have evolved gradually out of earlier and simpler beginnings."125 "We believe that at the beginning there was only a cloud of gaseous hydrogen. . . . It was the parent cloud of us all."126 "With the further passage of time, cells developed . . . and living organisms were started on the long road to the complexity of the creatures which exist today."127 How? "Life can appear spontaneously in any favorable planetary environment, and evolve into complex beings, provided vast amounts of time are available."128 "Thousands of skeletons and fossil remains mark the path by which life climbed upward from its crude beginnings."129 The principle of natural selection is, according to Jastrow, the great "new law . . . discovered by Charles Darwin," which "guides the course of evolution and shapes the forms of living creatures—on this planet and on all planets on which life has arisen—as firmly and as surely as gravity controls the stars and the planets."130

Karl Popper would deny this so-called law of nature even the title to a scientific theory: "There is a difficulty with Darwinism. . . . It is far from clear what we should consider a possible refutation of the theory of natural selection. If . . . we accept that statistical definition of fitness which defines fitness by actual survival, then the survival of the fittest becomes tautological, and irrefutable."131 Other objections come from biologists, geologists, physicists, and others. "I want to warn against . . . the basic assumption . . . that what is more simple in metabolism biochemically is more primitive and consequently older in the history of life. This assumption is entirely unjustified.132 In geology also, " 'simple' has also been largely confused with 'primitive' and with 'early.' "133 "The synthesis by natural inorganic processes of such large, complicated molecules [necessary for life] happens to be well-nigh impossible under present environmental circumstances. . . . These large organic molecules cannot at present exist on their own, inorganically; . . . they cannot be formed regularly, or even rarely, in natural inorganic chemistry and even if this would be possible, they are liable to immediate destruction."134 Even if life could be reproduced in the laboratory, "we could not say from our experiments that the living material in the universe arose in this way. . . . The assumption that life arose only once and that therefore all living things are interrelated [Jastrow's "single thread of evidence"] is a useful assumption. . . . But because a concept is useful it does not mean that it is necessarily correct."135 "Nothing is definitely known about what did happen; all is hypothesis, and though it is simpler to assume that it was a unique occurrence, there is no reason why this simple explanation should be the correct one."136 "But it is hard to see how this [natural selection] operates in the very early stages of development. It is also hard to see why it has led to the evolution of life forms of ever-increasing complexity. If survival is the essential characteristic for trapping fluctuations, very simple organisms would appear to be just as well, if not better, equipped than complicated ones."137

What many are pointing out today is that the mechanistic-evolutionary theory reverses both the direction of time and the order of nature. By the laws of thermodynamics, "left to itself, everything tends to become more and more disorderly until the final and natural state of things is a completely random distribution of matter. Any kind of order, even that as simple as the arrangement of atoms in a molecule, is unnatural and happens only by chance encounters that reverse the general trend. These events are statistically unlikely, and the further combination of molecules into anything as highly organized as a living organism is wildly improbable. Life is a rare and unreasonable thing."138

Jastrow is presenting the position of "the most extreme mechanistic faction . . . that all phenomena of life are explainable by means of our present body of physical and chemical theories. The reason I feel sure that this is not true is that these theories do not seem adequate even for inanimate phenomena. Most physicists agree that our present theories do not suffice to understand the nucleus of the atom, for example."139 "In biochemistry, based on this physics, we are able to account fully only for isolated phenomena, which will cease eventually. I cannot reconcile physical principles with the phenomena of life when considering the whole living unit. It is interesting that Niels Bohr concluded that life is a qualitatively different attribute of matter, not subject to current considerations in physics."140

Here some recent reflections on the evolutionary scene by eminent biologists are not out of place: "Is there any positive proof, from any part of the evidence, that evolution has, or has not, occurred? There is no visible proof, nor any kind of certain proof, either way, anywhere."141 "This theory can be called the 'General Theory of Evolution' and the evidence that supports it is not sufficiently strong to allow us to consider it as anything more than a working hypothesis."142 "Of course one can say that the small observable changes in modern species may be the sort of thing that lead to all the major changes, but what right have we to make such an extrapolation? We may feel that this is the answer to the problem, but is it a satisfactory answer? A blind acceptance of such a view may in fact be the closing of our eyes to as yet undiscovered factors which may remain undiscovered for many years if we believe that the answer has already been found."143 Today "Neocatastrophism" teaches that during the earth's past there have been "drastic turning-points, the cutting off of animal types, characterized by a widespread more or less contemporary extinction of numerous species and emergence and even exuberance of others." This has led eminent geologists to take positions which are "in opposition to Darwin's doctrine of gradual evolution, natural selection, and extinction as a normal process."144 "The extinction can only have been a sudden and decisive event," and we have "not only the dying out of older species (Stämme), but also the more or less sudden emergence of new ones," so that we "should speak of an anastrophe" rather than a catastrophe.145 The "argument . . . that the origin of life is essentially a problem in probability . . . is an insufficient and actually an unsuitable concept. Furthermore, this appears to me as even a dangerous mental attitude. It leads to a self-satisfied state of mind. We have an illusion that the problem can be explained with existing knowledge (a very natural tendency in scientists) and this lulls us into an attitude of not thinking really about the problem."146

Being tautological in nature, the evolutionary hypothesis explains very little. It has "two basic fallacies: . . . (1) it assumes that there is only one way in which a certain state of affairs, such as life, can exist; and (2) it assumes that the probability of a process can be calculated although its mechanism is unknown."147 It is a product of hindsight: its authors wrote the answer-book first, and then composed the problem around it. "Science is only restrospectively logical."148 "We might ask, why was the Piltdown monster accepted? The answer is very simple; it had been taylored [sic] according to scientific theory. . . . So when such a creature [a crass forgery] was found, the anthropologists recognized at once that they were right."149 "Most finds [of early man] were made, and I am proud we can say this, by men who wanted to find."150 "There is no doubt that the horse could have evolved in the manner described. But had Mr. Darwin lived fifty million years ago, he would certainly not have been able to predict that these changes would occur, even if he had known how the environment was going to change. Since his theory would not have served for predictions then, it is not adequate for an explanation now."151 "To say that the known changes could have been brought about by the described machinery does not explain these changes. . . . An adequate explanation is one which would have enabled us to predict the outcome, before it took place. But none of the present evolutionary theories enables us to make such predictions."152 "Many more questions will have to be answered before an evolutionary theory emerges that can make even simple predictions."153

Concerning the seven basic assumptions of evolution, G. A. Kerkut writes: "The first point that I should like to make is that these seven assumptions by their nature are not capable of experimental verification. They assume that a certain series of events has occurred in the past. Thus though it may be possible to mimic . . . this does not mean that these events must therefore have taken place in the past. All that it shows is that it is possible for such a change to take place. . . . We have to depend upon limited circumstantial evidence for our assumptions."154

Lyall Watson says, "life occurs by chance and that the probability of its occurring, and continuing, is infinitesimal. It is even more unlikely that this life could, in the comparatively short time it has existed on this planet, develop into more than a million distinct living forms. . . . To believe that this took place only by chance places a great strain on the credulity of even the most mechanistic biologist. The geneticist Waddington compares it to 'throwing bricks together in heaps' in the hope that they would 'arrange themselves into an inhabitable house.' "155 In atomic particles "it is the least massive and therefore longest living states which are the most important."156 "The physicochemical principle of selectivity . . . includes a tacit assumption of acquisition, of positive action, of building up the improbable and more complex from the more probable, less complex and of actually increasing stability as complexity increases."157 All of which actually reverses the order of Nature.

R. Buckminster Fuller has much to say on this theme. For him evolution "reassociates those elements in orderly molecular structures or as orderly organs of ever-increasing magnitude, thus effectively reversing the entropic behaviors of purely physical phenomena."158 This requires an explanation: "My continuing philosophy is predicated, first, on the assumption that in dynamical counterbalance of the expanding universe of entropically increasing random disorderliness, there must be a universal pattern of omniX contracting, convergent, progressive orderliness" which presents us with "an overwhelming confrontation of our experience by a comprehensive intellect magnificently greater than our own or the sum of all human intellects." The glory of God is intelligence, or, in the words of P. T. Matthews, "The sorting process—the creation of order out of chaos—against the natural flow of physical events is something which is essential to life."159 "A human being is, at very least, an assembly of chemicals constructed and maintained in a state of fantastically complicated organisation of quite unimaginable improbability."160 The reverse motion [opposing the direction of entropy], although formally allowed, is so improbable that it can be dismissed as impossible.161 "Any system will tend to degenerate into a condition with a minimum amount of mass, the largest number of parts and the maximum amount of motion."162 The answer to this has always been: "You cannot say it is a state of unimaginable improbability,"163 because it actually happens. You can see it happen! Therefore there is nothing fantastic or miraculous about it.

"For practical reasons," wrote P. T. Mora, "we developed a simplifying scientific approach in physics. We follow the dictates of Descartes, that one must divide . . . into as many parts as possible, and then study the simplest first. . . . However, complexity is an essential attribute of biological systems. . . . furthermore, in physics we avoid teleology, . . . but a certain type of teleological approach must be pertinent to the study of living systems."164 But the simplifying process has come to an end with the discovery that the ultimate hard, indivisible particle of the atomists, whose weight and shape alone accounted for all phenomena, vanishes into energy patterns of apparently endless complexity. Mr. Wheelis throws up his hands in despair: "We isolate what we study, simplify it, break it into smaller pieces, wash it"165 and then, lo, "mechanism disappears at precisely that point at which we were finally going to nail it down forever."166 "We have sacrificed the world for nothing."167 And so it would seem "we have come a long way on false credentials. . . . We are not entitled to grace in getting out, to peace with honor."168 "We have lived a delusion, we cannot know the world. Aided or unaided we stumble through an endless night, locked in a range of experience . . . given by what we are and where we live."169 He quotes Bridgman of M.I.T.: "Our conviction that nature is understandable and subject to law arose from the narrowness of our horizons. . . . We shall find that nature is intrinsically and in its elements neither understandable nor subject to law. . . . The world is not a world of reason, understandable by the intellect of man."170 "Between the electrical signals coming through the eye to the brain and our reaction to . . . a tree in blossom on a fresh spring day, there is a vast gap which physics shows no signs of ever being able to bridge."171 It may even be that whatever it is that is peculiar to life and particular to thought lies outside the scope of physical concepts."172 "The Universe is not only queerer than we imagine—it is queerer than we can imagine[!]"173 "And the real beginning of education must be the experimental realization of absolute mystery."174 "And the why-for and how-come of all . . . generalized principles . . . are all and together Absolute Mystery."175

Ancient Statements: If the ancients did not have the sophisticated instruments and methods now available, what they did have was far superior to anything that we have been willing to credit them with so far. Their methods were different, but to judge by the results, very effective.176 They had only too great faith in the principles of mechanistic materialism and natural selection (cf. Alma 30:15-18), and in the end turned from atomism and determinism to esoteric studies which have been dismissed as "mystical" but which present-day investigation shows to have been astonishingly fruitful in concepts very close to some of the most sophisticated scientific speculation of our time. Thus Matthews notes that "it is fascinating how close these diagrams [some very advanced 'quark patterns'] are to the number pattern which so impressed the Pythagoreans."177 The cosmological patterns set forth in numerous early Christian ("Gnostic") and Jewish works very recently discovered are at very least extremely high-class science-fiction. I myself am at present engaged in gathering and comparing such work.178 That Whitehead at the end of his life should turn to Plato as the best exponent of the reality around us is an indication of how far the ancients projected their physical researches into scientific speculation. In turning to "mystic" speculations, Plato and Aristotle, as Werner Jaeger shows, did not turn their backs to the physical universe. It was the Neo-Platonists and the later Doctors of the Christian church, following the lead of the scholars of Alexandria, who did that.

Notes to Part 4

1. Albert Guérard, Fossils and Presences (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957), 102.

2. For laughs, see John Jacob Astor's, A Journey in Other Worlds: A Romance of the Future, 6th ed. (New York: Appleton, 1898), 34-35; these pages provide a sketch of the year 2000.

3. Arthur C. Clarke, Profiles of the Future (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), chaps. 1 and 2.

4. "The Integrity of Science: A Report by the AAAS Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare," American Scientist 53 (June 1965): 176.

5. See Julian H. Steward, "Cultural Evolution," Scientific American 194 (May 1956): 69-80.

6. Joseph W. Krutch, "If You Don't Mind My Saying So. . . . .," American Scholar 35 (Spring 1966): 181.

7. William H. Whyte, Jr., Organization Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), 208.

8. Ibid., 215, 223.

9. Ibid., 226.

10. Albert W. Heere, in a letter to the Editor, in American Institute of Biological Science (AIBS) Bulletin (December 1960): 5.

11. Eric Hodgins, "The Strange State of American Research," Fortune (April 1955): 113.

12. A. L. Kroeber, "Statistics, Indo-European, and Taxonomy," Language 36 (1960): 19.

13. William K. Wright, "The End of the Day," The Philosophical Review 55 (July 1946): 328-29.

14. Julian Jaynes, "The Routes of Science," American Scientist 54 (March 1966): 94-95.

15. Edwyn Bevan, Hellenism and Christianity (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1921), 41 (emphasis added).

16. Eduard Norden, Antike Kunstprosa, 2 vol., 3rd ed. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1915), 2:655-56.

17. John Chrysostom, Oratio in Epistolam ad Hebraeos XII, 30, in PG 63:211.

18. Hugh Nibley, "Victoriosa Loquacitas: The Rise of Rhetoric and the Decline of Everything Else," Western Speech 20 (Spring 1956): 70-71; reprinted in this volume, pages 265-66.

19. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War III, 45, 5.

20. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle, tr. Richard Robinson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1948), 5.

21. Norden, Antike Kunstprosa, 2:807.

22. Ibid., 778.

23. C. E. M. Joad, Guide to Philosophy (New York: Dover, 1936), 524-25.

24. F. W. Ostwald, Die Philosophie der Werte, quoted in Stephen Toulmin, "Contemporary Scientific Mythology," in Metaphysical Beliefs (London: SCM, 1957), 30.

25. T. Neville George, Evolution in Outline (London: Thrift Books, 1951), 118-19.

26. Rudolf Jordan, The New Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 177.

27. Bertrand Russell, quoted in Clarke, Profiles of the Future, 248.

28. Nikolai Kozyrev, "An Unexplored World," Soviet Life (November 1965): 43.

29. Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), 43.

30. John Dewey, Living Philosophies (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1931), 27.

31. Warren Weaver, "The Imperfections of Science," American Scientist 49 (March 1961): 101.

32. J. C. Loehlin, "Machines with Personality," Science Journal 4 (October 1968): 98.

33. Gordon Taylor, "Focus," Science Journal 4 (June 1968): 31.

34. Warren S. McCulloch, "Mysterium Iniquitatis of Sinful Man Aspiring into the Place of God," Scientific Monthly 80 (January 1955): 37.

35. Jordan, The New Perspective, 144.

36. Lester G. Crocker, An Age of Crisis: Man and World in Eighteenth Century French Thought (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), 82-83.

37. Nolin P. Jacobson, "The Cultural Meaning of Science," Hibbert Journal 65 (Spring 1967): 92 (emphasis added).

38. Joad, Guide to Philosophy, 565.

39. M. G. Rutten, The Origin of Life by Natural Causes (New York: Elsevier, 1971), 4.

40. Theodosius Dobzhansky, "Evolution at Work," Science 127 (9 May 1958): 1091.

41. Morton S. Enslin, "A Gentleman among the Fathers," Harvard Theological Review 47 (October 1954): 241.

42. Ibid., 230, 238, 239.

43. Origen, In Leviticum Homilia 7, in PG 12:488-89.

44. Pavel Poucha, "Das tibetische Totenbuch im Rahmen der eschatologischen Literatur," Archiv Orientální 20 (1952): 162, who compares Pliny the Elder, Natural History VII, 55, 189.

45. Wilhelm Schmid, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur (Munich: Beck, 1940), 3:3:11.

46. Horace, Epistle I, 6, 1.

47. Adolf Erman, The Ancient Egyptians: A Sourcebook of Their Writings, tr. Aylward M. Blackman (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 85-88.

48. W. G. Lambert, Babylonian Wisdom Literature (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), 33, 35, 41, 77, 81, 109, 266-67, 278.

49. Karl Jaspers, quoted in Gerald W. Johnson, "Some Cold Comfort," American Scholar 35 (Spring 1966): 193.

50. Kozyrev, "An Unexplored World," 27.

51. John Langdon-Davies, Man and His Universe (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1930), 319.

52. Johnson, "Some Cold Comfort," 195.

53. Ibid.

54. Jacques Maritain, Science and Wisdom, tr. Bernard Wall (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1954), 48.

55. Ibid., 50.

56. Whyte, The Organization Man, 395.

57. Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, Lowell Lectures, 1925 (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 274.

58. W. G. Haverbeck, Das Ziel der Technik (Freiburg, 1965), reviewed in Zeitschrift für Geopolitik 15 (1967): 6.

59. Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (New York: Basic Books, 1962), 229.

60. Joseph Jacobs, quoted in Grey H. Skipwith, "The Origins of the Religion of Israel," Jewish Quarterly Review 12 (1900): 381.

61. Robin S. Allan, "Geological Correlation and Paleoecology," Bulletin of the Geological Society of America 59 (January 1948): 2.

62. Ibid.

63. John R. Platt, quoted in R. Buckminster Fuller, "Vision 65 Summary Lecture," American Scholar 35 (Spring 1966): 218.

64. Wiesner, quoted in ibid.

65. Krutch, "If You Don't Mind," 183.

66. Clarke, Profiles of the Future, 216.

67. Ibid., 213.

68. Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000 (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 263.

69. Iago Galdston, "Existentialism as a Perennial Philosophy of Life and Being," Journal of Existential Psychiatry 1 (Fall 1960): 379.

70. Norden, Antike Kunstprosa, 2:453-55.

71. Bevan, Hellenism and Christianity, 156.

72. Ibid., 145-54.

73. Friedrich Cauer, "Die Stellung der arbeitenden Klassen in Hellas und Rom," Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum, Geschichte und deutsche Literatur 3 (n.d.): 700-702.

74. Nibley, "Victoriosa Loquacitas," 70-72; reprinted in this volume, pages 265-69.

75. Justin, in PG 6:1316 (see response to question 74).

76. Hugh Nibley, "The Unsolved Loyalty Problem: Our Western Heritage," Western Political Quarterly 6 (December 1953): 632-35; reprinted in this volume, pages 196-200.

77. Norden, Antike Kunstprosa, 1:20-21, 2:507.

78. Plato, Gorgias 518-19; Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, tr. Gilbert Highet, 3 vols. (New York: Oxford University, 1945), 1:330-31.

79. W. Bossuet, Judisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1915), 6.

80. Arnold Lunn and J. B. S. Haldane, Science and the Supernatural (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1935), 50.

81. Arnold Lunn, The Flight from Reason (New York: Dial, 1931), 21.

82. Nicolas Berdyaev, Solitude and Society (London: Centenary, 1938), 6.

83. Norden, Antike Kunstprosa, 2:712-13.

84. Maurice de Wulf, History of Mediaeval Philosophy, 2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1952), 1:173.

85. Ibid., 210.

86. James Hastings, ed., "Mysticism," in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, 12 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), 9:100.

87. Charles Dickens, "In the Name of the Prophet—Smith!" Household Words 3 (19 July 1851): 385.

88. Eduard König, "The Modern Attack on the Historicity of the Religion of the Patriarchs," Jewish Quarterly Review 22 (1931/32): 120-21.

89. Herbert W. Schneider, "Evolution and Theology in America ["The Influence of Darwin and Spencer on American Philosophical Theology"]," Journal of the History of Ideas 6 (January 1945): 3-18.

90. Morris R. Cohen, American Thought: A Critical Sketch (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 240.

91. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 270.

92. Nels F. S. Ferré, "Which Way British Theology?" Expository Times 70 (July 1959): 305.

93. Henri Leclercq, "Église," in Henri Leclercq and Fernand Cabrol, eds., Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1907), 4:2228-30.

94. J. Lebreton, "Le désaccord de la foi populaire et de la théologie savante," Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique 19A (1923): 481-83.

95. Reinhold Seeberg, Text-Book of the History of Doctrines, vol. 1 of History of Doctrines in the Ancient Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1952), 160.

96. Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History V, 28, 13-14, in PG 20:516.

97. Anna Miura-Stange, Celsus und Origenes (Giessen: Topelmann, 1926) in Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche, Beiheft 4 (1926): 59-118.

98. Minucius Felix, Octavius, in G. Goetz, Die literarhistorische Stellung des Octavius von Minucius Felix (Giessen: Töpelmann, 1926), 161-63.

99. Justin, in PG 6:1316, Question 74.

100. G. Florovsky, "Eschatology in the Patristic Age," in Kurt Aland and F. L. Cross, eds., Studia Patristica II in Texte und Unter-suchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur 64 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1957), 246, 248.

101. Martin Grabmann, Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, 2 vols. (Graz: Adademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1957), 2:87-91.

102. Franklin L. Baumer, Religion and the Rise of Scepticism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960), 19-20.

103. Alfred N. Whitehead, quoted in Lucien Price, "To Live without Certitude," Atlantic Monthly 193 (March 1954): 59.

104. Pierre L. du Noüy, Human Destiny (New York: Longmans, Green, 1947), 264.

105. Cf. Hugh Nibley, "The Return of the Prophets?" in The World and the Prophets (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1966), 258-72; reprinted in CWHN 3:284-98.

106. Hugh Nibley, "Jerusalem: In Christianity," in Encyclopedia Judaica 9:1570-75, and Hugh Nibley, "Christian Envy of the Temple," Jewish Quarterly Review 50 (1959/60): 109-23; reprinted in CWHN 4:323-54 and 391-434 respectively.

107. O. R. Frisch, "Tactics and Strategy of Science," Science Journal 5 (November 1969): 84, a review of P. B. Medawar's Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought.

108. Martin Greenberg, ed., The Robot and the Man (New York: Gnome, 1953), vi.

109. Berdyaev, Solitude and Society, 20 (emphasis added); cf. Norbert Samuelson, "That the God of the Philosophers Is Not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," Harvard Theological Review 65 (1972): 1-28; Robin Attfield, "The God of Religion and the God of Philosophy," Religious Studies 9 (March 1973): 1-9.

110. See Hugo Rahner, Greek Myths and Christian Mystery (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), xv, 387-90.

111. Karl R. Popper, "Science: Problems, Aims, Responsibilities," Federation Proceedings of the American Societies for Experimental Biology 22 (1963): 962.

112. "Fifth General Epistle," Deseret News, 22 March 1851, 225.

113. Joseph Fielding Smith, Selections from Answers to Gospel Questions: A Course of Study for the Melchizedek Priesthood Quorums of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 1972/73 (Salt Lake City: Deseret News Press, 1972), 191.

114. Ibid., 190-91.

115. Allen Wheelis, The End of the Modern Age (New York: Basic Books, 1971), 33.

116. Ibid., 34.

117. Ibid., 43.

118. Ibid., 64.

119. P. T. Matthews, Nuclear Apple, 117-18.

120. Ibid., 116-17.

121. Ibid., 16.

122. Ibid., 19.

123. Robert Jastrow, Red Giants and White Dwarfs (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

124. Ibid., 5.

125. Ibid., 123.

126. Ibid., 130-31.

127. Ibid., 139.

128. Ibid., 152.

129. Ibid., 155.

130. Ibid., 157.

131. Popper, "Science: Problems, Aims, Responsibilities," 964.

132. M. G. Rutten, The Geological Aspects of the Origin of Life on Earth (New York: Elsevier, 1962), 124.

133. Ibid., 125.

134. Ibid., 46.

135. G. A. Kerkut, ed., Implications of Evolution, International Series of Monographs on Pure and Applied Biology; Division: Zoology, vol. 4 (New York: Pergamon, 1960), 8.

136. Ibid., 17.

137. P. T. Matthews, The Nuclear Apple (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971), 143.

138. Lyall Watson, Supernature (New York: Doubleday, 1973), 5.

139. J. G. Kemeny, A Philosopher Looks at Science (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1959), 211-12.

140. Peter T. Mora, "The Folly of Probability," in Sidney W. Fox, The Origins of Prebiological Systems (New York: Academic, 1965), 46.

141. J. Challinor, "Palaeontology and Evolution," in P. R. Bell, ed., Darwin's Biological Work, Some Aspects Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1959), 53.

142. Kerkut, Implications of Evolution, 157.

143. Ibid., 154.

144. Otto H. von Schindewolf, "Neokatastrophismus," Zeitschrift der deutschen geologischen Gesellschaft 114 (1963): 430.

145. Ibid., 431.

146. Mora, "The Folly of Probability," 50.

147. Norman W. Pirie, "Some Assumptions Underlying Discussion on the Origins of Life," Annals, New York Academy of Sciences (1956): 370.

148. Ibid., 371.

149. G. H. R. von Koenigswald, "Early Man: Facts and Fantasy," Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland Journal 94 (1964): 76.

150. Ibid., 69.

151. Kemeny, A Philosopher Looks at Science, 200.

152. Ibid., 199.

153. Ibid., 207.

154. Kerkut, Implications of Evolution, 7.

155. Watson, Supernature, 8.

156. Matthews, The Nuclear Apple, 105.

157. Mora, "The Folly of Probability," 47-48.

158. Fuller, Intuition, 70.

159. Matthews, The Nuclear Apple, 143.

160. Ibid., 142.

161. Cf. Mora, "The Folly of Probability," 43, 49.

162. Ibid., 71-72.

163. Ibid., 142.

164. Ibid., 49.

165. Wheelis, The End of the Modern Age, 61.

166. Ibid., 62.

167. Ibid., 70.

168. Ibid., 77.

169. Ibid., 115.

170. Ibid., 65.

171. Matthews, The Nuclear Apple, 141.

172. Ibid., 142.

173. J. B. S. Haldane, in Clarke, Profiles of the Future, 139.

174. Fuller, Intuition, 50.

175. R. Buckminster Fuller, Intuition (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 42.

176. Giorgio de Santillana, The Origins of Scientific Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).

177. Matthews, The Nuclear Apple, 100.

178. For a discussion of cosmological patterns in early Christian (Gnostic) and Jewish works, see Hugh Nibley, "Treasures in the Heavens: Some Early Christian Insights into the Organizing of the Worlds," Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought 8/3-4 (1973): 76-98; reprinted in CWHN 1:171-214.