Paths That Stray:
Some Notes on Sophic and Mantic - Part 4

Part 4: Proposition 9 to Conclusion

Proposition 9. The world without the Mantic offers the best
test of the Sophic. It is marked by (A) piteous disappointment, (B) a puzzling
deadness of spirit, and (C) a world plagued by doubt, insecurity, cynicism, and

A. The Sophic program always ends in failure, leading to
disappointment and disillusionment among its advocates.

Modern Statements: It now appears that "the nineteenth
century, which believed itself boldly progressive, was spiritually a period of
obscurantism and reaction."1 The vast promises of the nineteenth century
have not been realized.2 The scientists, especially astronomers, have turned
out to be very poor scientific prophets; and as a rule the better the
scientist, the weaker his prophetic powers—they lack the Mantic touch.3
Ecological crises "reveal serious inadequacies" which hitherto
escaped notice in many areas.4 There has been a comical disproportion between
the promises and pretensions of anthropology and its accomplishments.5 "It
is obvious . . . that the Wellsian dream [of a mechanized utopia] has turned
into a nightmare."6 With all the talk and promise of the exciting quest
for knowledge, "only one new chemical reaction [has been] discovered by an
American chemical company during the last fifteen years."7 "Practically
all who are now Ph.D.s want to be told what to do. . . . They seem to be scared
to death to think up problems of their own," while the "idea for a
jet engine . . . was met with a massive indifference from the scientific
bureaucracy."8 "In social science, particularly, methodology is
being made the route to prestige."9 "Fashions in topics of study and
methods of research have come one after another. . . . As a result we have
botanists who know no plants and zoologists who know no animals."10 "Our
wealth of scientific gadgets and our vast organization of scientific projects
are in heavy disproportion to our depth of scientific thought. We ‘research the
hell’ out of everything: we contemplate very little."11 In philology and
scholarship a deterioration of knowledge has taken place in the last thirty
years, especially in America. Today the tendency in linguistics is in the "direction
of overall anarchy" in which most classifications of unwritten languages
contain "elements of unreliability."12 In philosophy, "how many
doctor’s theses . . . are ever actually read by any one except the examiners?"13 Instead of an insatiable, predicted demand for scientists and engineers,
most of them soon become obsolescent.14

Ancient Statements: With the rise of rationalist (Sophic)
Greek civilization, "one might seem to have got a principle of continuous
progress. . . . In our modern civilization, which reincarnates the Hellenic
principle, we ordinarily believe that such continuous modification and
improvement is going on. But in the ancient Hellenic civilization the promise
and potency of its principle in every line of activity . . . seemed to meet
with an arrest
as suddenly as it had begun."15 Bevan is mystified by
this: Why did Hellenism, in the very moment of completing its conquest, become
paralyzed? Why does the study of Greek literature always stop at the threshold
of the Hellenistic period? Because only the Mantic writers are interesting! The
new education of the Greeks thought of itself as throbbing with life and
vitality; to keep up the illusion it had to go on progressively adding lurid to
sensational materials until in the end "the powerful spicing had become
the main dish" and all was ruined.16 Education did nothing to check intellectual
and moral decline and, if anything, accelerated it.17 Intellectually
everything ground to a halt, just as the school reached the peak of its
splendor.18 There was a paralyzing finality about the arguments of the
Sophists, who "looked for no revelation." Under Sophist tutelage, "the
Athenians were already losing their sense of political reality, . . . growing
impatient of sincerity and plain truth."19 Isocrates’ conviction that
education would be the solution to everything turned out to be a great
disappointment. Contrary to expectation, "There was no steady advance of
natural and mental science to serve as breeding ground" for future
scientists among the followers of Aristotle, whose teaching was converted into
a "purely conceptual scholasticism."20 Though the Sophists gave us "a
2000-year unbroken tradition" of rational learning beginning with Gorgias,
the Schoolmen expended those centuries in the usual perennial arguments over
the relative merits of the New versus the Old Education.21 "And the
intellectual scribblers of the decadent period" strongly influenced the
thinking of the Late Renaissance.22

B. The result is nihilism, societal breakdown, and a
puzzling deadness of spirit.

Modern Statements: The "clearest and the most
comprehensive expression" of the world view of Darwinism was given by
Tyndale, noting that in the " ‘purely natural and inevitable march of
evolution from atoms . . . to the proceedings of the British Association for
the Advancement of Science’ . . . life is of profound unimportance," being
a "mere eddy in the primeval slime."23 "We must in all
circumstances learn to accept the fact that . . . in the longest run, the sum
of all human endeavour has no recognizable significance."24 "A
scientific explanation of the course of evolution therefore avoids reference to
either purpose or progress in its recognition of the factors of change."25 "Life on earth is nothing but some elements expressing generally
available energy in a specific rhythm. Man is nothing but a living creature
expressing general tendencies in special reflections."26 "That all
the labours of the ages . . . are destined to extinction in the vast death of
the solar system, . . . beneath the debris of a universe in ruin, . . . [is] so
nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand."27 Hence the obsession with entropy, "the rigid determinism desiccating
the world actually follows from the equations of mechanics and is the essence
of its laws."28 "At the end [we find the mute and terrifying world
of Pascal’s ‘libertin,’ the senseless world of modern scientific philosophy. In
the end] we find nihilism and despair."29 "Such happiness as life is
capable of comes from the full participation of all our powers in the endeavor
to wrest from each changing situation of experience its own full and unique

Determined attempts are made, especially in England, to
obliterate all distinction between the human mind and the automatic computer.
The idea is "that man, if he is indeed nothing but an improved beast, can
by one more easy step be nothing more than a mere machine—an object which
science can wholly analyze, wholly capture within its special framework."31 The robot works on exactly the same behavioristic principles as James Watson’s
or John Dewey’s human being; there is no essential difference between them.32
Already people are being programmed to act as machines, "to behave like
computers . . . I [Gordon Taylor] am shocked that [the University of Michigan]
tolerated this,"33 while the fundamental and eternal battle between good
and evil in humanity is disbelieved. "That we can design ethical robots .
. . is enough to prove that man’s moral nature needs no supernatural source."34 "There is no morality in life, no truth, no goodness, and no beauty.
Life in all its adaptability and elasticity is as elemental as iron or sulfur
or oxygen or carbon. This is the correct perspective of life. It would indeed
save much trouble and avoid many unnecessary errors if philosophers and
scientists could look at life in the correct perspective."35 "I like
a philosophy which exalts mankind. To degrade it is to encourage men to vice,"
writes Diderot, yet in the next line goes on: "When I have compared men to
the immense space which is over their heads and under their feet, I have made
them ants that bustle about on an anthill. . . . Their vices and their virtues,
shrinking in the same proportion, are reduced to nothingness."36 Science "is
teaching them for the first time to use their minds, not to seek reassurance in
the face of life’s suffering and separation, and not to look for some escape
from transitoriness that is one of the unavoidable features of existence, but
to strengthen and multiply the connective links that establish human life more
firmly in its natural habitat by eliminating error and illusion and distortion
and rendering more and more transparent our relations with one another and with
the rest of nature."37 Thus it takes the easy way and pushes downhill,
making a virtue of the negative: as if men did not already recognize their
miserable state! Science gives us a world without values: aesthetic, ethical,
religious, "But a world which is without value, Whitehead points out, is
also a world without meaning. . . . The world just is; it cannot be explained."38 This was the great appeal of science to the Marxists: "The goal was a
completely materialistic theory of life."39 Marx thought his system was "somehow
deducible from Darwin’s discoveries. He proposed to acknowledge his
indebtedness by dedicating Das Kapital to Darwin."40 On the other hand,
A. Wheelis’s End of the Modern Age shows how laissez-faire capitalism was the
direct offspring and corollary of the same naturalistic determinism, with the
same amoral materialism. So we read conscientious scholarly Russian studies on "From
the Other Side to This Side: A Guide to Atheism," "Concreteness in
Studying the Overcoming of Religious Survivals," "Atheistic Education
and the Overcoming of Religious Survivals," and "The Principles of
Scientific Atheism in Technical Colleges."

Ancient Statements: How closely the ancient Sophic attitude
matches the modern is revealed in a statement of Professor Enslin of Harvard:
Clement of Alexandria scorns the " ‘simple’ Christians" who were "afraid
of Greek philosophy as children fear ghosts."41 Though Clement’s own
writings are full of "rubbish . . . triple-A nonsense; . . . frequent
highly fanciful, at times grotesque, derivations of words and terms," even
"pathetic nonsense," they at least show him to be "a man who
prized insight, who preferred the voice of reasoned conviction to the braying
of Balaam’s ass."42 In the same spirit, Origen, also a product of the
University of Alexandria, wrote, when he read the Torah, "I blush to think
that God could have given these laws; the laws of men, of the Romans,
Athenians, Spartans, for example, are far nobler and more reasonable."43 "Modern
humanity for the most part shares the view of Pliny" that "the belief
in rebirth or life after death is nothing but a pacifier for children and
belongs to a mortality greedy for everlasting life."44 The strength of
the Sophic is its appeal to the obvious, its contemptuous dismissal of belief
in anything we cannot see, which enabled it to turn the Mantic out of doors
with ease, merrily debunking anything that required an effort of faith or

The credo of the educated was and remained Horace’s Nil
"don’t take anything seriously"46—Horace describes
himself good naturedly as a cheerful pig from the sty of Epicurus; but as for
believing in anything—credat Judaeus Appeles—let the Jews believe
that sort of stuff! The same depressing and hopeless attitude dominates in the
Wisdom Literature of the Egyptians47 and of the Babylonians.48

C. It is the moral condition of life in a world without
Mantic that most strongly proclaims the bankruptcy of the Sophic.

Modern Statements: "The beginning of modern science is
also the beginning of a calamity."49 Why? For one thing, robbing life of
meaning makes a hash of morality. The fundamental principle of modern physics
is that "the transition of the world into the equilibrium state [entropy],
and hence its death, is inevitable and irreversible. . . . Thus, the world is
to become a sheer desert-like monotony. . . . Despite its significance and
progress, theoretical mechanics seems a dry or even dull science. Perhaps this
is an emotional indicator of the incompleteness of the principles of the exact
sciences. The trouble here," continues Nikolai Kozyrev, is "the deep
discrepancy between the world of the exact sciences and the real world,"
while all are taught to believe that the world of science is the real world and
the only world.50 "Thus it comes about, fantastic though it may sound,
that men lie with their neighbour’s wives denuded of the last shred of a guilty
conscience because observations of the changes of Mercury’s perihelion enabled
Einstein to alter our ideas about space-time!"51 The "problem of
evil, . . . science for five hundred years has deliberately excluded from its
purview."52 "The force that devastated Hiroshima is really
insignificant by comparison with the force that devastated the district of
Watts,"53 but both may be traced to the same immoral source. "There
is no longer a philosophy of nature; . . . the whole field of the knowledge of
sensible nature is given over to the sciences of phenomena, to empiriological
science. . . . By the same token there is no longer any speculative
metaphysics."54 Science is "now without superior direction or light,
is abandoned to empirical and quantitative law, and is entirely separated from
the whole order of wisdom."55

Everyone wants promotion and prestige on the ship, "But
where is the boat going? No one seems to have the faintest idea; nor, for that
matter, do they see much point in even raising the question. . . . Most see
themselves as objects more acted upon than acting—and their future,
therefore, determined as much by the system as by themselves."56 This is
plainly seen in the dependence of our whole well-being on the imponderables of
the Dow Jones averages. The Sophic promised that it could handle everything: "Modern
science and modern conditions of life have taught us to meet occasions of
apprehension by a critical analysis of their causes and conditions" rather
than by appealing to heaven.57 It has always been promised that mankind could
be freed from all its shackles by technology.58 But now it turns out that the
Sophic does not even offer escape from dullness. "Truth is not the only
aim of science
. We want more than mere truth: what we look for is interesting
."59 This is diametrically opposed to most university departments
that teach that they are only doing their job when they are dull and, like the
Berlin School of Egyptology, glory in their strict avoidance of anything that
might be interesting; they have found something heroic in mere patient plodding
and had a horror of "Fantasie" and "Romantik." The highest
reward for them was professional status, as it is for the heroes of C. P. Snow’s
novels, all eminent Cambridge scientists who have only one object in
life—to achieve ever more "eminence." They will engage in all
manner of fraud and deception to achieve it; their work interests them only as
long as they can show off to the world and to each other. "Darwinism has
come, and has conquered, and as a vital influence in the spiritual life, has
gone."60 Science could not even hold up its own end. "Because of the
sterility of its concepts, historical geology . . . has become static and
unproductive.61 Since then plate tectonics have livened things up a bit, but
still "most of us refuse to discard or reformulate, and the result is the
present deplorable state of our discipline."62 What kept them going?
Showmanship, self-dramatization: without the stage of the university to show
off on, where would most of us be?

And so we have the present state of the world described by
Chicago University physicist John R. Platt: "too dangerous for anything
but Utopia."63 Science has made it dangerous, but provides no Utopia.
Jerome Wiesner of M.I.T. claimed: "The armaments race is an accelerating
downward-spiral to Oblivion."64 So will accumulation of scientific
knowledge save us? It is now so specialized that "even engineers would not
know how to reconstruct the machinery of our civilization if it somehow
collapsed or was destroyed."65 "The [amount of] knowledge in the
world [in 1960] is doubling every ten years. . . . Soon . . . our entire
culture will have collapsed owing to its incomprehensive complexity."66
We have reached a saturation point, though "probably 99 per cent of human
ability has been wholly wasted; even today, those of us who consider ourselves
cultured . . . glimpse the profounder resources of our minds only once or twice
in a lifetime.67 There are "many unpleasant ways in which the world can
go wrong [and very few in which it] can go right."68 The human animal may
have fatally overreached itself unless it takes on some sense in the eleventh
hour. Meanwhile, we resign ourselves to Existentialism, "the philosophical
refuge of the despairing spirit caught in the turmoil of moral crisis. It has
always been—and is today, essentially and at its core, a bitter-sweet
philosophy of despair."69 This is 100 years after William James
challenged the world to do the honest thing and base its philosophy only on the
firm foundation of unyielding despair.

Ancient Statements: The ancients went through the same
experience and collapsed. With the complete victory of the Sophic mind a
namenloses Elend (indefinable malaise) covered the whole glorious Hellenistic
world. Christianity has been blamed for this, but Christian influence became
dominant only after the churchmen themselves had gone all out to accommodate to
the prevailing Sophic teaching of the time—that of Alexandria: then it
was that all joy seemed to go out of the world.70 Long before Christian
influence was felt, the world of the Roman Satirists was full blown: an utterly
cynical, immoral, and pessimistic world. The rational (Sophic) mood of
Hellenism had emancipated men from moral restraints, when, as today, they "speak
and write as if the relation of the sexes were something that could be put on a
plain, scientific, common sense basis,"71 but at the same time, as Bevan
shrewdly observes, they became everywhere obsessed with a passion for bathing,
a constant obsession with fighting dirt and a fanatical desire to flee from it
and sweeten themselves—subconscious betrayal of guilt.72

Intellectually, the accumulation of knowledge reached a
saturation point when the cultural and intellectual "deposit of the past
had become too great for any mind to absorb" and people simply gave up
trying, as they have today.73 The easy way was to specialize and thus lose
sight of the larger questions of life; the best thinking of the professors for
centuries on end became thereafter incurably trivial.74 Calls to a revival of
Hellenism got nowhere.75 The great antique civilization subsided into a
restless, superficial world of theatromania, mob violence, crime and corruption.76 The only security was found in the university, where the doctors held
undeviatingly to the age-old routines of hollow lectures, fierce feuds, and
adroit politics, oblivious to the world collapsing around them. Quintillian
advises the young to "stay away from the big schools!" with their
cynicism and immorality, but then admits that they do offer the best chances
for a career in any field. By the fifth century nobody knew what to believe,
since the schoolmen had made a virtue of questioning everything without really
looking for an answer—busywork and self-deception had become the way of
life.77 In the end it was the teaching of the "physicist" that men
should look for the explanation to all things in natural causes alone that laid
the foundation for the ruin of everything, according to Plato.78

Proposition 10. Our notes add up to something quite
unexpected. I had expected to do the inevitable and call for a proper balance
between the Sophic and the Mantic, each of which has its faults as well as its
virtues. But that is not the way it turns out at all! Not for me, at least.
Nothing could be plainer than the lesson that the human race in the times under
survey has disastrously neglected the Mantic. The Christian Church went all out
to identify itself with the Sophic, as it still does.

Modern Statements: The founders of Roman Catholic theology "had
a boundless esteem for the work of the Schools."79 To begin with, the
Church claims to found its case on reason. The Catholic believes that he can
produce reasoned and convincing, even coercive arguments. Even the doctrine of
the Trinity can be proved indirectly by reason, since "it is not . . .
irrational to accept these truths on the authority of the Church, provided that
you can prove by reason that the Church is infallible"80 and "the
credentials of the Roman Catholic Church can be proved by pure reason and by
pure reason alone."81 "Medieval philosophy was not so much a servant
of theology as theology was a servant of philosophy. . . . That was the case of
Saint Thomas Aquinas, who strictly subordinated theology to Aristotelian
philosophy."82 Under the Scholastic philosophers, "philosophy called
‘Logic’ dominated the schools . . . logica sola placet, science was everything."83 The logica nova84 of the twelfth century was a heritage of the Ancient
Sophist schools, "a triumph of sophistry."85 The mystical trends of
the seventeenth century were vigorously condemned by the Church, since
revelation "is universally denied by the scholastics."86 Even the
early Jesuits were given a bad time for toying with the idea of revelation.

Modern Protestantism objected to Mormonism primarily on
grounds of scientific enlightenment—"seeing visions in an age of
railways" was Dickens’s withering comment.87 Protestantism broke with
Scholasticism, but its rejection of revelation led it straight into the arms of
nineteenth-century natural science and Hegel’s philosophy of history, "formulated
by materialism and Darwinism into the dogma that all historical phenomena may
be explained through mundane causes only and that their development was or must
have been from a low to a high level."88 Biblical criticism insisted on
following the rigorous, unflinchingly skeptical procedures of science.89 In a
spirit of emancipation "they talk of a religion without theology; but when
pressed as to what that means, they offer a diffuse romantic sentimentalism,
with rhapsodies over a pursuit of goodness . . . and at last to a sort of
perpetual motion ever ‘upward and onward’ but with no indication of any
specific direction."90 Alfred North Whitehead sums up the process of
accommodation: Each new scientific advance has "found the religious
thinkers unprepared," until "finally, after struggle" their
teachings were "modified and otherwise interpreted," so that "the
next generation of religious apologists then congratulates the religious world
on the deeper insight which has been gained," and so it goes with "continued
repetition of this undignified retreat, during many generations."91 And
so from the beginning, by a progressive accommodation, the churches have always
remained respectably Sophic.

Today the churches are suggesting that they may have erred
in this, and are calling for revelation to rescue them. "Liberalism was
the voice of secular confidence in science, education and culture. It
accommodated its claims to fit human expectations. . . . For this reason it
failed to find wings. Theological accommodationism is a parasite dependent on
its host. . . . Liberalism is dead, or dying, as secular confidence wains."92

Statements on the Ancient Church: "From the 5th century
on the Church became an ‘intellectual’ entity" and ever since one sees in "the
Church a thing of reason—un être de raison."93 Mosheim asked: Was
the conversion of the Doctors a blessing or a curse for the Church? to which he
replied: "I must confess myself unable to decide the point." In the
third century this led to serious clashes between popular faith and the
sophisticated theology of the Doctors.94 The Doctors won hands-down. The
authority of Alexandria prevailed, "recasting the permanent elements of
the church’s doctrine in harmony with a religious philosophy of Grecian
character. What the Apologists were compelled to do, these men willingly sought
to accomplish."95 By the beginning of the second century, "with
perfect impunity . . . they proceeded to do violence to the scripture, blithely
disregarding the original teachings, . . . busily working out elaborate
structures of syllogisms. . . . They deserted the Holy Scriptures for . . .
Euclid, . . . Aristotle, and Theophrastus."96 Challenged by Celsus, a
doughty champion of the Sophic, Origen yields to him on every point, explaining
that Celsus does not realize that real Christians are all for science, too.97
In a like situation, Octavius points out to his educated friend that all real
Christians are philosophers, just as he is; the vulgar simply don’t understand.98 The Churchmen embraced Hellenism even though they knew it had overcome early
Christianity.99 "In the philosophical interpretation of its
eschatological hope, Christian theology from the very beginning clings to
Aristotle," who "provided Christian philosophers with all the
elements out of which an adequate conception of personality could be built up.
. . . One cannot fail to acknowledge the Aristotelian origin of the main
anthropological ideas in early Christian theology."100 It is possible to
call St. Augustine, the founder of Catholic and Protestant theology, "the
first modern man" because of his fides quaerens intellectum—the
Mantic seeking to become Sophic.101

Proposition 11. An approach to the authentically Mantic is
(A) desirable, and (B) possible

A. The need for a "return" to the Mantic is felt
today as it was anciently.

Modern Statements: " ‘Modern man’ . . . is the heir of .
. . the sceptical tradition. . . . In the present epoch a large and increasing
number of Europeans have expressed the desire to return [to] . . . the
religious tradition. . . . Whenever they take it into their head to ‘return,’
the shades of all the great sceptics, Pierre Bayle and Voltaire, Ernest Renan
and Sigmund Freud and the rest, rise up around them and persuade them, with
considerable success, that they cannot go back. This is the religious dilemma
of ‘modern man.’ "102 They cannot go back, because they were never
there—their religion was always Sophic. "The trouble with the Bible
has been its interpreters, who have scaled and whittled down that sense of
infinitude into finite and limited concepts. . . . Here we are with our finite
beings and physical senses in the presence of a universe whose possibilities
are infinite, and even though we may not apprehend them, those infinite
possibilities are actualities."103 "God grant that we are mistaken.
But if we have read the signs of the times correctly, . . . the only salvation
for mankind will be found in religion."104 "The ruling concept of
our day, the degrading and life-impoverishing error of a Nature which is not
deeply and inwardly bound to our own natures, must be overcome. The idea of a
spiritual life without spirit, that can be examined like a problem in physics,
must be overcome."105

Ancient Statements: Plato and Aristotle, after mastering the
Sophic, both turned whole-heartedly to the Mantic quest. In the pagan world the
cult of Serapis was a determined attempt to turn Mantic; in the Christian, the
turning to Monasticism, pilgrimages, and the temple show a yearning for the
Mantic,106 all strenuously opposed by the Doctors of the Church.

B. Is it possible?

"But today the Baconian approach is all but dead. . . .
How does a new hypothesis come into existence? That is where intuition comes
in." Peter Medawar claims that "Scientists are usually too proud or
too shy"; where intuition is concerned, "they feel it to be incompatible
with their conception of themselves as men of facts and rigorous inductive
judgments."107 Some scientists have suggested, to avoid yielding any
purely scientific ground, the idea of man initiating a line of robots which
then independently culminate in the production of a perfect robot, which
proceeds to create—a human race!108 thus bringing God into the picture
without having to apologize! Today there is increasing realization in the
churches that "the living God to Whom men address their prayers is the God
of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, not the philosophers’ God, the idea of the
Absolute."109 Countless articles today point out that we cannot attain
the Mantic without revelation. For a definitive statement, see the first
section of the Doctrine and Covenants.

We are not advocating pagan religion in preference to modern
, since both stand on the same foundation through centuries of
accommodation. Yet some Christian leaders view Greek Mantic with respect and
even call for a return to it through Christian channels!110 The true seeker
seeks everywhere—he is a true scientist—but to search he must be a
believer; for even in the lab, "Ye receive no witness until after the
trial of your faith" (Ether 12:6). To illustrate this, "Bacon . . .
was an enemy of the Copernican hypothesis. Don’t theorize, he said, but open
your eyes and observe without prejudice (faith), and you cannot doubt that the
Sun moves and that the Earth is at rest. By contrast, Galileo [wrote:] . . . ‘I
cannot . . . express strongly enough my unbounded admiration for the greatness
of mind of these men who conceived (the heliocentric system) and held it to be
true . . . , in violent opposition to the evidence of their own senses.’ "111 It is perfectly proper to believe and seek, to have faith and hope, and to
labor to be worthy of receiving revelation.

The Mantic is quite as intellectual as the Sophic: it takes
more pure mental calculation to operate a Urim and Thummim than it does to use
an Egyptian dictionary, and the brainwork required of the Saints is formidable
(cf. D&C 93:53). In a General Epistle of the First Presidency in 1851 they
were told, "It becomes us, as Saints of the Most High, to inform and
become informed; and to treasure up knowledge and wisdom concerning all things."112 Knowledge does not have to be Sophic to be real and exact; in the
Melchizedek Priesthood Manual for 1972/73, President Joseph Fielding Smith
equated real knowledge with the gift of the Holy Ghost: "There is nothing
more important in the lives of members of the Church than to have the gift of
the Holy Ghost. There is nothing of greater importance to the individual member
of the Church than the gift of knowledge, and this does not come by observation
but by constant study and faith."113 "There should be no ‘laymen’ in
the Church. . . . If there are any such, then they have neglected their
responsibilities. . . . Each member of the Church should be so well versed that
he, or she, would be able to discern whether or not any doctrine taught
conforms to the revealed word of the Lord. Moreover, the members of the Church
are entitled [through obedience to the commandments] . . . to have the spirit
of discernment."114

Proposition 12. It is Science that now challenges the Sophic
position. "Science" has at least discredited the Sophic position.
Since the days of the ancient Atomists, the Sophic view of life has rested on
two propositions: (A) that all existence is composed ultimately of discrete
irreducible particles, beyond which and beside which there is no reality; (B)
that all things are the result of the random accidental interactions of these
particles. Both these propositions are today being declared bankrupt, not by
the philosophers and theologians, but by the physical and biological

Modern Statements: The Atomist proposition explained by
Descartes: "From complex whole move to less complex part. Reduce! . . .
from multiplicity to uniformity."115 Hume: "You will find it [the
whole] to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number
of lesser machines."116 "Humanities strove to become sciences, each
science to become physics, . . . the ultimate destination in every field being
always that final elementary particle."117 But instead of the ultimate
particle "our holy mission to get it all straight has yielded an
ever-proliferating brood of erratically behaving elementary particles. . . . ‘The
conception of objective reality,’ writes Heisenberg, ‘has thus evaporated . . .
into the transparent clarity of a mathematics that represents no longer the
behavior of particles but rather our knowledge of this behavior.’"118 "The
structure of a physical system such as a proton is now seen to be no absolute
thing . . . but a relative concept which depends on the energy involved and the
particular properties which are being studied. . . . There is no substance in
the argument that physics must ultimately have a full stop in constituent parts
too simple to be analysed further."119 "[Banging] the hadrons
together . . . has completely upset the atomist notion that there is a limit to
divisibility. . . . As the energy is increased there is no logical limit to . .
. what may be found as we look deeper into space."120 "There is
really only one law, which is that the total energy is conserved."121 "Energy
. . . is the fundamental physical quantity of which mass and
radiation—matter and light—are two manifestations."122

The clearest expression of the theory of random chance
evolution is Robert Jastrow’s popular book Red Giants and White Dwarfs123
(which has been required reading in some courses at BYU): "Yet the fact is
that a single thread of evidence runs from the atom and the nucleus through the
formation of stars and planets to the complexities of the living organism."124 "Darwin saw that the forms of life existing on the earth today have
evolved gradually out of earlier and simpler beginnings."125 "We
believe that at the beginning there was only a cloud of gaseous hydrogen. . . .
It was the parent cloud of us all."126 "With the further passage of
time, cells developed . . . and living organisms were started on the long road
to the complexity of the creatures which exist today."127 How? "Life
can appear spontaneously in any favorable planetary environment, and evolve
into complex beings, provided vast amounts of time are available."128 "Thousands
of skeletons and fossil remains mark the path by which life climbed upward from
its crude beginnings."129 The principle of natural selection is,
according to Jastrow, the great "new law . . . discovered by Charles
Darwin," which "guides the course of evolution and shapes the forms
of living creatures—on this planet and on all planets on which life has
arisen—as firmly and as surely as gravity controls the stars and the

Karl Popper would deny this so-called law of nature even the
title to a scientific theory: "There is a difficulty with Darwinism. . . .
It is far from clear what we should consider a possible refutation of the
theory of natural selection. If . . . we accept that statistical definition of
fitness which defines fitness by actual survival, then the survival of the
fittest becomes tautological, and irrefutable."131 Other objections come
from biologists, geologists, physicists, and others. "I want to warn
against . . . the basic assumption . . . that what is more simple in metabolism
biochemically is more primitive and consequently older in the history of life.
This assumption is entirely unjustified.132 In geology also, " ‘simple’
has also been largely confused with ‘primitive’ and with ‘early.’ "133 "The
synthesis by natural inorganic processes of such large, complicated molecules
[necessary for life] happens to be well-nigh impossible under present
environmental circumstances. . . . These large organic molecules cannot at present
exist on their own, inorganically; . . . they cannot be formed regularly, or
even rarely, in natural inorganic chemistry and even if this would be possible,
they are liable to immediate destruction."134 Even if life could be
reproduced in the laboratory, "we could not say from our experiments that
the living material in the universe arose in this way. . . . The assumption
that life arose only once and that therefore all living things are interrelated
[Jastrow’s "single thread of evidence"] is a useful assumption. . . .
But because a concept is useful it does not mean that it is necessarily
correct."135 "Nothing is definitely known about what did happen; all
is hypothesis, and though it is simpler to assume that it was a unique
occurrence, there is no reason why this simple explanation should be the
correct one."136 "But it is hard to see how this [natural selection]
operates in the very early stages of development. It is also hard to see why it
has led to the evolution of life forms of ever-increasing complexity. If
survival is the essential characteristic for trapping fluctuations, very simple
organisms would appear to be just as well, if not better, equipped than
complicated ones."137

What many are pointing out today is that the
mechanistic-evolutionary theory reverses both the direction of time and the
order of nature. By the laws of thermodynamics, "left to itself,
everything tends to become more and more disorderly until the final and natural
state of things is a completely random distribution of matter. Any kind of
order, even that as simple as the arrangement of atoms in a molecule, is
unnatural and happens only by chance encounters that reverse the general trend.
These events are statistically unlikely, and the further combination of molecules
into anything as highly organized as a living organism is wildly improbable.
Life is a rare and unreasonable thing."138

Jastrow is presenting the position of "the most extreme
mechanistic faction . . . that all phenomena of life are explainable by means
of our present body of physical and chemical theories. The reason I feel sure
that this is not true is that these theories do not seem adequate even for
inanimate phenomena. Most physicists agree that our present theories do not
suffice to understand the nucleus of the atom, for example."139 "In
biochemistry, based on this physics, we are able to account fully only for
isolated phenomena, which will cease eventually. I cannot reconcile physical
principles with the phenomena of life when considering the whole living unit.
It is interesting that Niels Bohr concluded that life is a qualitatively
different attribute of matter, not subject to current considerations in

Here some recent reflections on the evolutionary scene by
eminent biologists are not out of place: "Is there any positive proof,
from any part of the evidence, that evolution has, or has not, occurred? There
is no visible proof, nor any kind of certain proof, either way, anywhere."141 "This theory can be called the ‘General Theory of Evolution’ and the
evidence that supports it is not sufficiently strong to allow us to consider it
as anything more than a working hypothesis."142 "Of course one can
say that the small observable changes in modern species may be the sort of
thing that lead to all the major changes, but what right have we to make such
an extrapolation? We may feel that this is the answer to the problem, but is it
a satisfactory answer? A blind acceptance of such a view may in fact be the
closing of our eyes to as yet undiscovered factors which may remain
undiscovered for many years if we believe that the answer has already been
found."143 Today "Neocatastrophism" teaches that during the
earth’s past there have been "drastic turning-points, the cutting off of
animal types, characterized by a widespread more or less contemporary
extinction of numerous species and emergence and even exuberance of others."
This has led eminent geologists to take positions which are "in opposition
to Darwin’s doctrine of gradual evolution, natural selection, and extinction as
a normal process."144 "The extinction can only have been a sudden
and decisive event," and we have "not only the dying out of older
species (Stämme), but also the more or less sudden emergence of new ones,"
so that we "should speak of an anastrophe" rather than a catastrophe.145 The "argument . . . that the origin of life is essentially a problem
in probability . . . is an insufficient and actually an unsuitable concept.
Furthermore, this appears to me as even a dangerous mental attitude. It leads
to a self-satisfied state of mind. We have an illusion that the problem can be
explained with existing knowledge (a very natural tendency in scientists) and
this lulls us into an attitude of not thinking really about the problem."146

Being tautological in nature, the evolutionary hypothesis
explains very little. It has "two basic fallacies: . . . (1) it assumes
that there is only one way in which a certain state of affairs, such as life,
can exist; and (2) it assumes that the probability of a process can be
calculated although its mechanism is unknown."147 It is a product of
hindsight: its authors wrote the answer-book first, and then composed the
problem around it. "Science is only restrospectively logical."148 "We
might ask, why was the Piltdown monster accepted? The answer is very simple; it
had been taylored [sic] according to scientific theory. . . . So when such a
creature [a crass forgery] was found, the anthropologists recognized at once
that they were right."149 "Most finds [of early man] were made, and
I am proud we can say this, by men who wanted to find."150 "There is
no doubt that the horse could have evolved in the manner described. But had Mr.
Darwin lived fifty million years ago, he would certainly not have been able to
predict that these changes would occur, even if he had known how the
environment was going to change. Since his theory would not have served for
predictions then, it is not adequate for an explanation now."151 "To
say that the known changes could have been brought about by the described
machinery does not explain these changes. . . . An adequate explanation is one
which would have enabled us to predict the outcome, before it took place. But
none of the present evolutionary theories enables us to make such predictions."152 "Many more questions will have to be answered before an evolutionary
theory emerges that can make even simple predictions."153

Concerning the seven basic assumptions of evolution, G. A.
Kerkut writes: "The first point that I should like to make is that these
seven assumptions by their nature are not capable of experimental verification.
They assume that a certain series of events has occurred in the past. Thus
though it may be possible to mimic . . . this does not mean that these events
must therefore have taken place in the past. All that it shows is that it is
possible for such a change to take place. . . . We have to depend upon limited
circumstantial evidence for our assumptions."154

Lyall Watson says, "life occurs by chance and that the
probability of its occurring, and continuing, is infinitesimal. It is even more
unlikely that this life could, in the comparatively short time it has existed
on this planet, develop into more than a million distinct living forms. . . .
To believe that this took place only by chance places a great strain on the
credulity of even the most mechanistic biologist. The geneticist Waddington
compares it to ‘throwing bricks together in heaps’ in the hope that they would ‘arrange
themselves into an inhabitable house.’ "155 In atomic particles "it
is the least massive and therefore longest living states which are the most
important."156 "The physicochemical principle of selectivity . . .
includes a tacit assumption of acquisition, of positive action, of building up
the improbable and more complex from the more probable, less complex and of
actually increasing stability as complexity increases."157 All of which
actually reverses the order of Nature.

R. Buckminster Fuller has much to say on this theme. For him
evolution "reassociates those elements in orderly molecular structures or
as orderly organs of ever-increasing magnitude, thus effectively reversing the
entropic behaviors of purely physical phenomena."158 This requires an
explanation: "My continuing philosophy is predicated, first, on the
assumption that in dynamical counterbalance of the expanding universe of
entropically increasing random disorderliness, there must be a universal
pattern of omniX contracting, convergent, progressive orderliness" which
presents us with "an overwhelming confrontation of our experience by a
comprehensive intellect magnificently greater than our own or the sum of all
human intellects." The glory of God is intelligence, or, in the words of
P. T. Matthews, "The sorting process—the creation of order out of
chaos—against the natural flow of physical events is something which is
essential to life."159 "A human being is, at very least, an assembly
of chemicals constructed and maintained in a state of fantastically complicated
organisation of quite unimaginable improbability."160 The reverse motion
[opposing the direction of entropy], although formally allowed, is so
improbable that it can be dismissed as impossible.161 "Any system will
tend to degenerate into a condition with a minimum amount of mass, the largest
number of parts and the maximum amount of motion."162 The answer to this
has always been: "You cannot say it is a state of unimaginable
improbability,"163 because it actually happens. You can see it happen!
Therefore there is nothing fantastic or miraculous about it.

"For practical reasons," wrote P. T. Mora, "we
developed a simplifying scientific approach in physics. We follow the dictates
of Descartes, that one must divide . . . into as many parts as possible, and
then study the simplest first. . . . However, complexity is an essential
attribute of biological systems. . . . furthermore, in physics we avoid
teleology, . . . but a certain type of teleological approach must be pertinent
to the study of living systems."164 But the simplifying process has come
to an end with the discovery that the ultimate hard, indivisible particle of
the atomists, whose weight and shape alone accounted for all phenomena,
vanishes into energy patterns of apparently endless complexity. Mr. Wheelis
throws up his hands in despair: "We isolate what we study, simplify it,
break it into smaller pieces, wash it"165 and then, lo, "mechanism
disappears at precisely that point at which we were finally going to nail it
down forever."166 "We have sacrificed the world for nothing."167 And so it would seem "we have come a long way on false credentials. .
. . We are not entitled to grace in getting out, to peace with honor."168
"We have lived a delusion, we cannot know the world. Aided or unaided we
stumble through an endless night, locked in a range of experience . . . given
by what we are and where we live."169 He quotes Bridgman of M.I.T.: "Our
conviction that nature is understandable and subject to law arose from the
narrowness of our horizons. . . . We shall find that nature is intrinsically
and in its elements neither understandable nor subject to law. . . . The world
is not a world of reason, understandable by the intellect of man."170 "Between
the electrical signals coming through the eye to the brain and our reaction to
. . . a tree in blossom on a fresh spring day, there is a vast gap which
physics shows no signs of ever being able to bridge."171 It may even be
that whatever it is that is peculiar to life and particular to thought lies
outside the scope of physical concepts."172 "The Universe is not
only queerer than we imagine—it is queerer than we can imagine[!]"173 "And the real beginning of education must be the experimental
realization of absolute mystery."174 "And the why-for and how-come
of all . . . generalized principles . . . are all and together Absolute

Ancient Statements: If the ancients did not have the
sophisticated instruments and methods now available, what they did have was far
superior to anything that we have been willing to credit them with so far.
Their methods were different, but to judge by the results, very effective.176
They had only too great faith in the principles of mechanistic materialism and
natural selection (cf. Alma 30:15-18), and in the end turned from atomism and
determinism to esoteric studies which have been dismissed as "mystical"
but which present-day investigation shows to have been astonishingly fruitful
in concepts very close to some of the most sophisticated scientific speculation
of our time. Thus Matthews notes that "it is fascinating how close these
diagrams [some very advanced ‘quark patterns’] are to the number pattern which
so impressed the Pythagoreans."177 The cosmological patterns set forth in
numerous early Christian ("Gnostic") and Jewish works very recently
discovered are at very least extremely high-class science-fiction. I myself am
at present engaged in gathering and comparing such work.178 That Whitehead at
the end of his life should turn to Plato as the best exponent of the reality
around us is an indication of how far the ancients projected their physical
researches into scientific speculation. In turning to "mystic"
speculations, Plato and Aristotle, as Werner Jaeger shows, did not turn their
backs to the physical universe. It was the Neo-Platonists and the later Doctors
of the Christian church, following the lead of the scholars of Alexandria, who
did that.

Notes to Part 4

1. Albert Guérard, Fossils and Presences (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1957), 102.

2. For laughs, see John Jacob Astor’s, A Journey in Other
Worlds: A Romance of the Future
, 6th ed. (New York: Appleton, 1898), 34-35;
these pages provide a sketch of the year 2000.

3. Arthur C. Clarke, Profiles of the Future (New York:
Harper and Row, 1962), chaps. 1 and 2.

4. "The Integrity of Science: A Report by the AAAS
Committee on Science in the Promotion of Human Welfare," American
53 (June 1965): 176.

5. See Julian H. Steward, "Cultural Evolution,"
Scientific American 194 (May 1956): 69-80.

6. Joseph W. Krutch, "If You Don’t Mind My Saying So. .
. . .," American Scholar 35 (Spring 1966): 181.

7. William H. Whyte, Jr., Organization Man (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1956), 208.

8. Ibid., 215, 223.

9. Ibid., 226.

10. Albert W. Heere, in a letter to the Editor, in American
Institute of Biological Science (AIBS) Bulletin
(December 1960): 5.

11. Eric Hodgins, "The Strange State of American
Research," Fortune (April 1955): 113.

12. A. L. Kroeber, "Statistics, Indo-European, and
Taxonomy," Language 36 (1960): 19.

13. William K. Wright, "The End of the Day," The
Philosophical Review
55 (July 1946): 328-29.

14. Julian Jaynes, "The Routes of Science,"
American Scientist 54 (March 1966): 94-95.

15. Edwyn Bevan, Hellenism and Christianity (London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1921), 41 (emphasis added).

16. Eduard Norden, Antike Kunstprosa, 2 vol., 3rd ed.
(Leipzig: Teubner, 1915), 2:655-56.

17. John Chrysostom, Oratio in Epistolam ad Hebraeos XII,
30, in PG 63:211.

18. Hugh Nibley, "Victoriosa Loquacitas: The Rise of
Rhetoric and the Decline of Everything Else," Western Speech 20 (Spring
1956): 70-71; reprinted in this volume, pages 265-66.

19. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War III, 45, 5.

20. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle, tr. Richard Robinson (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1948), 5.

21. Norden, Antike Kunstprosa, 2:807.

22. Ibid., 778.

23. C. E. M. Joad, Guide to Philosophy (New York: Dover,
1936), 524-25.

24. F. W. Ostwald, Die Philosophie der Werte, quoted in
Stephen Toulmin, "Contemporary Scientific Mythology," in Metaphysical
(London: SCM, 1957), 30.

25. T. Neville George, Evolution in Outline (London: Thrift
Books, 1951), 118-19.

26. Rudolf Jordan, The New Perspective (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1951), 177.

27. Bertrand Russell, quoted in Clarke, Profiles of the
, 248.

28. Nikolai Kozyrev, "An Unexplored World," Soviet
(November 1965): 43.

29. Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), 43.

30. John Dewey, Living Philosophies (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1931), 27.

31. Warren Weaver, "The Imperfections of Science,"
American Scientist 49 (March 1961): 101.

32. J. C. Loehlin, "Machines with Personality,"
Science Journal 4 (October 1968): 98.

33. Gordon Taylor, "Focus," Science Journal 4
(June 1968): 31.

34. Warren S. McCulloch, "Mysterium Iniquitatis of
Sinful Man Aspiring into the Place of God," Scientific Monthly 80 (January
1955): 37.

35. Jordan, The New Perspective, 144.

36. Lester G. Crocker, An Age of Crisis: Man and World in
Eighteenth Century French Thought
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959),

37. Nolin P. Jacobson, "The Cultural Meaning of
Science," Hibbert Journal 65 (Spring 1967): 92 (emphasis added).

38. Joad, Guide to Philosophy, 565.

39. M. G. Rutten, The Origin of Life by Natural Causes (New
York: Elsevier, 1971), 4.

40. Theodosius Dobzhansky, "Evolution at Work,"
Science 127 (9 May 1958): 1091.

41. Morton S. Enslin, "A Gentleman among the Fathers,"
Harvard Theological Review 47 (October 1954): 241.

42. Ibid., 230, 238, 239.

43. Origen, In Leviticum Homilia 7, in PG 12:488-89.

44. Pavel Poucha, "Das tibetische Totenbuch im Rahmen
der eschatologischen Literatur," Archiv Orientální 20 (1952): 162, who
compares Pliny the Elder, Natural History VII, 55, 189.

45. Wilhelm Schmid, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur
(Munich: Beck, 1940), 3:3:11.

46. Horace, Epistle I, 6, 1.

47. Adolf Erman, The Ancient Egyptians: A Sourcebook of
Their Writings
, tr. Aylward M. Blackman (New York: Harper and Row, 1966),

48. W. G. Lambert, Babylonian Wisdom Literature (London:
Oxford University Press, 1960), 33, 35, 41, 77, 81, 109, 266-67, 278.

49. Karl Jaspers, quoted in Gerald W. Johnson, "Some
Cold Comfort," American Scholar 35 (Spring 1966): 193.

50. Kozyrev, "An Unexplored World," 27.

51. John Langdon-Davies, Man and His Universe (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1930), 319.

52. Johnson, "Some Cold Comfort," 195.

53. Ibid.

54. Jacques Maritain, Science and Wisdom, tr. Bernard Wall
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1954), 48.

55. Ibid., 50.

56. Whyte, The Organization Man, 395.

57. Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World,
Lowell Lectures, 1925 (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 274.

58. W. G. Haverbeck, Das Ziel der Technik (Freiburg, 1965),
reviewed in Zeitschrift für Geopolitik 15 (1967): 6.

59. Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations (New York:
Basic Books, 1962), 229.

60. Joseph Jacobs, quoted in Grey H. Skipwith, "The
Origins of the Religion of Israel," Jewish Quarterly Review 12 (1900):

61. Robin S. Allan, "Geological Correlation and
Paleoecology," Bulletin of the Geological Society of America 59 (January
1948): 2.

62. Ibid.

63. John R. Platt, quoted in R. Buckminster Fuller, "Vision
65 Summary Lecture," American Scholar 35 (Spring 1966): 218.

64. Wiesner, quoted in ibid.

65. Krutch, "If You Don’t Mind," 183.

66. Clarke, Profiles of the Future, 216.

67. Ibid., 213.

68. Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000 (New
York: Macmillan, 1967), 263.

69. Iago Galdston, "Existentialism as a Perennial Philosophy
of Life and Being," Journal of Existential Psychiatry 1 (Fall 1960): 379.

70. Norden, Antike Kunstprosa, 2:453-55.

71. Bevan, Hellenism and Christianity, 156.

72. Ibid., 145-54.

73. Friedrich Cauer, "Die Stellung der arbeitenden
Klassen in Hellas und Rom," Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum,
Geschichte und deutsche Literatur
3 (n.d.): 700-702.

74. Nibley, "Victoriosa Loquacitas," 70-72;
reprinted in this volume, pages 265-69.

75. Justin, in PG 6:1316 (see response to question 74).

76. Hugh Nibley, "The Unsolved Loyalty Problem: Our
Western Heritage," Western Political Quarterly 6 (December 1953): 632-35;
reprinted in this volume, pages 196-200.

77. Norden, Antike Kunstprosa, 1:20-21, 2:507.

78. Plato, Gorgias 518-19; Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The
Ideals of Greek Culture
, tr. Gilbert Highet, 3 vols. (New York: Oxford
University, 1945), 1:330-31.

79. W. Bossuet, Judisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in
Alexandria und Rom
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1915), 6.

80. Arnold Lunn and J. B. S. Haldane, Science and the
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1935), 50.

81. Arnold Lunn, The Flight from Reason (New York: Dial,
1931), 21.

82. Nicolas Berdyaev, Solitude and Society (London:
Centenary, 1938), 6.

83. Norden, Antike Kunstprosa, 2:712-13.

84. Maurice de Wulf, History of Mediaeval Philosophy, 2
vols. (New York: Dover, 1952), 1:173.

85. Ibid., 210.

86. James Hastings, ed., "Mysticism," in
Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, 12 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner’s
Sons, 1951), 9:100.

87. Charles Dickens, "In the Name of the
Prophet—Smith!" Household Words 3 (19 July 1851): 385.

88. Eduard König, "The Modern Attack on the Historicity
of the Religion of the Patriarchs," Jewish Quarterly Review 22 (1931/32):

89. Herbert W. Schneider, "Evolution and Theology in
America ["The Influence of Darwin and Spencer on American Philosophical
Theology"]," Journal of the History of Ideas 6 (January 1945): 3-18.

90. Morris R. Cohen, American Thought: A Critical Sketch
(New York: Collier Books, 1962), 240.

91. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 270.

92. Nels F. S. Ferré, "Which Way British Theology?"
Expository Times 70 (July 1959): 305.

93. Henri Leclercq, "Église," in Henri Leclercq
and Fernand Cabrol, eds., Dictionnaire d’archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie
(Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1907), 4:2228-30.

94. J. Lebreton, "Le désaccord de la foi populaire et
de la théologie savante," Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 19A (1923):

95. Reinhold Seeberg, Text-Book of the History of Doctrines,
vol. 1 of History of Doctrines in the Ancient Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Book House, 1952), 160.

96. Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History V, 28, 13-14, in PG

97. Anna Miura-Stange, Celsus und Origenes (Giessen:
Topelmann, 1926) in Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die
Kunde der älteren Kirche
, Beiheft 4 (1926): 59-118.

98. Minucius Felix, Octavius, in G. Goetz, Die
literarhistorische Stellung des Octavius von Minucius Felix
Töpelmann, 1926), 161-63.

99. Justin, in PG 6:1316, Question 74.

100. G. Florovsky, "Eschatology in the Patristic Age,"
in Kurt Aland and F. L. Cross, eds., Studia Patristica II in Texte und
Unter-suchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur
64 (Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1957), 246, 248.

101. Martin Grabmann, Geschichte der scholastischen Methode,
2 vols. (Graz: Adademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1957), 2:87-91.

102. Franklin L. Baumer, Religion and the Rise of Scepticism
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960), 19-20.

103. Alfred N. Whitehead, quoted in Lucien Price, "To
Live without Certitude," Atlantic Monthly 193 (March 1954): 59.

104. Pierre L. du Noüy, Human Destiny (New York: Longmans,
Green, 1947), 264.

105. Cf. Hugh Nibley, "The Return of the Prophets?"
in The World and the Prophets (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1966), 258-72;
reprinted in CWHN 3:284-98.

106. Hugh Nibley, "Jerusalem: In Christianity," in
Encyclopedia Judaica 9:1570-75, and Hugh Nibley, "Christian Envy of the
Temple," Jewish Quarterly Review 50 (1959/60): 109-23; reprinted in CWHN
4:323-54 and 391-434 respectively.

107. O. R. Frisch, "Tactics and Strategy of Science,"
Science Journal 5 (November 1969): 84, a review of P. B. Medawar’s Induction
and Intuition in Scientific Thought

108. Martin Greenberg, ed., The Robot and the Man (New York:
Gnome, 1953), vi.

109. Berdyaev, Solitude and Society, 20 (emphasis added);
cf. Norbert Samuelson, "That the God of the Philosophers Is Not the God of
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," Harvard Theological Review 65 (1972): 1-28;
Robin Attfield, "The God of Religion and the God of Philosophy,"
Religious Studies 9 (March 1973): 1-9.

110. See Hugo Rahner, Greek Myths and Christian Mystery (New
York: Harper and Row, 1963), xv, 387-90.

111. Karl R. Popper, "Science: Problems, Aims,
Responsibilities," Federation Proceedings of the American Societies for
Experimental Biology
22 (1963): 962.

112. "Fifth General Epistle," Deseret News, 22
March 1851, 225.

113. Joseph Fielding Smith, Selections from Answers to
Gospel Questions: A Course of Study for the Melchizedek Priesthood Quorums of
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 1972/73
(Salt Lake City:
Deseret News Press, 1972), 191.

114. Ibid., 190-91.

115. Allen Wheelis, The End of the Modern Age (New York: Basic
Books, 1971), 33.

116. Ibid., 34.

117. Ibid., 43.

118. Ibid., 64.

119. P. T. Matthews, Nuclear Apple, 117-18.

120. Ibid., 116-17.

121. Ibid., 16.

122. Ibid., 19.

123. Robert Jastrow, Red Giants and White Dwarfs (New York:
Harper and Row, 1971).

124. Ibid., 5.

125. Ibid., 123.

126. Ibid., 130-31.

127. Ibid., 139.

128. Ibid., 152.

129. Ibid., 155.

130. Ibid., 157.

131. Popper, "Science: Problems, Aims,
Responsibilities," 964.

132. M. G. Rutten, The Geological Aspects of the Origin of Life
on Earth
(New York: Elsevier, 1962), 124.

133. Ibid., 125.

134. Ibid., 46.

135. G. A. Kerkut, ed., Implications of Evolution,
International Series of Monographs on Pure and Applied Biology; Division:
Zoology, vol. 4 (New York: Pergamon, 1960), 8.

136. Ibid., 17.

137. P. T. Matthews, The Nuclear Apple (London: Chatto and
Windus, 1971), 143.

138. Lyall Watson, Supernature (New York: Doubleday, 1973),

139. J. G. Kemeny, A Philosopher Looks at Science
(Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1959), 211-12.

140. Peter T. Mora, "The Folly of Probability," in
Sidney W. Fox, The Origins of Prebiological Systems (New York: Academic, 1965),

141. J. Challinor, "Palaeontology and Evolution,"
in P. R. Bell, ed., Darwin’s Biological Work, Some Aspects Reconsidered
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1959), 53.

142. Kerkut, Implications of Evolution, 157.

143. Ibid., 154.

144. Otto H. von Schindewolf, "Neokatastrophismus,"
Zeitschrift der deutschen geologischen Gesellschaft 114 (1963): 430.

145. Ibid., 431.

146. Mora, "The Folly of Probability," 50.

147. Norman W. Pirie, "Some Assumptions Underlying
Discussion on the Origins of Life," Annals, New York Academy of Sciences
(1956): 370.

148. Ibid., 371.

149. G. H. R. von Koenigswald, "Early Man: Facts and
Fantasy," Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
94 (1964): 76.

150. Ibid., 69.

151. Kemeny, A Philosopher Looks at Science, 200.

152. Ibid., 199.

153. Ibid., 207.

154. Kerkut, Implications of Evolution, 7.

155. Watson, Supernature, 8.

156. Matthews, The Nuclear Apple, 105.

157. Mora, "The Folly of Probability," 47-48.

158. Fuller, Intuition, 70.

159. Matthews, The Nuclear Apple, 143.

160. Ibid., 142.

161. Cf. Mora, "The Folly of Probability," 43, 49.

162. Ibid., 71-72.

163. Ibid., 142.

164. Ibid., 49.

165. Wheelis, The End of the Modern Age, 61.

166. Ibid., 62.

167. Ibid., 70.

168. Ibid., 77.

169. Ibid., 115.

170. Ibid., 65.

171. Matthews, The Nuclear Apple, 141.

172. Ibid., 142.

173. J. B. S. Haldane, in Clarke, Profiles of the Future,

174. Fuller, Intuition, 50.

175. R. Buckminster Fuller, Intuition (New York: Doubleday,
1972), 42.

176. Giorgio de Santillana, The Origins of Scientific
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).

177. Matthews, The Nuclear Apple, 100.

178. For a discussion of cosmological patterns in early
Christian (Gnostic) and Jewish works, see Hugh Nibley, "Treasures in the
Heavens: Some Early Christian Insights into the Organizing of the Worlds,"
Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought 8/3-4 (1973): 76-98; reprinted in CWHN